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1295 
WRONGLY “IDENTIFIED”: WHY AN ACTUAL 
KNOWLEDGE STANDARD SHOULD GOVERN 
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS’ FALSE CLAIMS 
ACT OBLIGATIONS TO REPORT AND RETURN 
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID OVERPAYMENTS  
INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, Medicare spent $632 billion on health care for America’s 
elderly (and other covered groups).1 Medicaid spent another $554 billion to 
provide health care to America’s needy.2 The government estimates that 
 
 
 1. JULIETTE CUBANSKI & TRICIA NEUMAN, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE FACTS ON MEDICARE 
SPENDING AND FINANCING 1 (2016), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-The-Facts-on-
Medicare-Spending-and-Financing. This $632 billion total was about 15% of the 2015 federal budget. 
Id. Medicare is a government program, administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 
the primary function of which is to provide health insurance to people age 65 or older. Medicare 
Program—General Information, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www. 
cms.gov/medicare/medicare-general-Information/medicareGenInfo/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 
2017). It also covers people younger than 65 with certain disabilities, as well as anyone with end-stage 
renal disease. Id. Medicare has four parts: A, B, C, and D. Broadly speaking, Part A covers inpatient 
services (i.e., those requiring admission to a hospital), while Part B provides coverage for outpatient 
care. See David Blumenthal, Karen Davis & Stuart Guterman, Medicare at 50—Origins and Evolution, 
372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 479, 480 (2015). Part A covers things like hospital care, skilled nursing facility 
care, nursing home care, hospice, and home health services. What Part A Covers, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE 
& MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/part-a/what-part-a-covers.html 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2017). Part B covers clinical research, ambulance services, durable medical 
equipment, mental health care, second opinions before surgery, and limited outpatient prescription 
drugs. What Part B Covers, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/part-b/what-medicare-part-b-covers.html (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2017). Part C allows those enrolled in Parts A and B to enroll in certain Medicare-approved 
private health insurance plans (known as “Medicare Advantage” plans). How Do Medicare Advantage 
Plans Work?, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.medicare. gov/sign-up-change-
plans/medicare-health-plans/medicare-advantage-plans/how-medicare-advantage-plans-work.html (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2017). Part D provides prescription drug coverage. Drug Coverage (Part D), CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.medicare.gov/part-d/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 
2017). 
 2. This figure is based on the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ estimate for fiscal year 
2015. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 2015 ACTUARIAL REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL 
OUTLOOK FOR MEDICAID 15 (2015), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Research/ActuarialStudies/Downloads/MedicaidReport2015.pdf. Medicaid is “a joint state-
federal program in which healthcare providers serve poor or disabled patients and submit claims for 
government reimbursement.” Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 
1989, 1996–97 (2016). Under the program, states pay “health care providers for services rendered to 
Medicaid recipients,” Kane ex rel. United States v. Healthfirst, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 3d 370, 375 n.3 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), and the federal government then provides states with matching funds. See KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID: AN OVERVIEW OF SPENDING ON “MANDATORY” VS. “OPTIONAL” 
POPULATIONS AND SERVICES 1 (2005), http://www.kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/ 
2013/01/medicaid-an-overview-of-spending-on.pdf. To participate in Medicaid, states must cover 
certain “mandatory” beneficiaries. They may also choose to cover other “optional” beneficiaries. Id. at 
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improper payments account for as much as 10% of Medicare and Medicaid 
spending.3 Given the vast amount of money at stake, and the fact that there 
is bipartisan support for recovering taxpayer dollars,4 it is no surprise the 
federal government has made it a priority to recoup the money lost to health 
care fraud each year.5 The results are noticeable: annual recoveries for 
health care fraud through the federal government’s most powerful anti-fraud 
weapon, the False Claims Act (FCA or “the Act”),6 have increased from 
$932 million in 2000 to a high-water mark of more than $3 billion in 2012.7 
 
 
1–3. In general, mandatory beneficiaries include low-income children and parents, the low-income 
elderly, and the low-income disabled. Id. at 1–2. Optional beneficiaries largely come from these same 
groups, but have incomes above the threshold for mandatory coverage. Id. at 2–3. Those states that 
accepted the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion must now cover “all individuals under the age 
of 65 with incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty line.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012) (emphasis deleted) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2012)). 
 3. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-448, MEDICARE PROGRAM: ADDITIONAL 
ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE ELIGIBILITY VERIFICATION OF PROVIDERS AND SUPPLIERS 1 (2015) 
(citing an estimate by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services that improper payments accounted 
for 10.8% of Medicare spending in 2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671021.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND 
PROGRAM INTEGRITY: AN OVERVIEW FOR PROVIDERS 2–3 (2016) (citing an estimate by the United 
States Office of Management and Budget that the improper payment rate for Medicaid in 2015 was 
9.78%), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare-Medicaid-Coordination/Fraud-Prevention/ Medicaid-Integrity-
Education/Downloads/fwa-overview-booklet.pdf. Professor Malcolm Sparrow has put the figure even 
higher, at 10–20%. Criminal Prosecution as a Deterrent to Health Care Fraud: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 13 (2009) (statement of 
Malcolm Sparrow, Professor, Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government). 
 4. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A Critique of the 
Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 239, 239–40 (1999); Joan H. Krause, 
Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of Government Harm Under the Civil False 
Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121, 124 (2001) (“[A]nti-fraud rhetoric now pervades the national health 
care debate, with health care providers joining Cadillac-driving ‘welfare queens’ and $400 hammers as 
the subjects of apocryphal tales of government fraud.”); William M. Sage, Fraud and Abuse Law, 282 
JAMA 1179, 1180 (1999) (stating that, when it comes to reducing health care spending, “eliminating 
‘waste, fraud, and abuse’ is [one] of the few steps about which disparate political ideologies can agree”); 
Joseph W. Golinkin II, Note, Fishing with Landmines: Healthcare Fraud and the Civil False Claims 
Act—Where We Are, How We Got Here, and the Case for More Trials, 40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301, 302 
(2013) (“[H]ealthcare fraud [is] one of the few subjects upon which policymakers from both major 
political parties can agree.”).  
 5. See Paul E. Kalb, Health Care Fraud and Abuse, 282 JAMA 1163, 1163 (1999) (stating that 
the Department of Justice has made health care fraud its second-highest priority behind only violent 
crime); Stephanie Armour, U.S. Recovers $3.3 Billion in Federal Health-Care Fraud; Obama 
Administration Steps up Efforts to Prevent Medicare Fraud, not Just Uncover It, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 
19, 2015) (noting that “[t]he Obama Administration has been intensifying its focus on fraud and waste”), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-recovers-3-3-billion-in-federal-health-care-fraud-1426737703; Press 
Release, Dep’t of Justice, Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Efforts Result in Record-
breaking Recoveries Totaling Nearly $4.1 Billion (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.justice. 
gov/opa/pr/health-care-fraud-prevention-and-enforcement-efforts-result-record-breaking-recoveries.  
 6. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012). 
 7. Fraud Statistics—Health and Human Services: Oct. 1, 1987–Sept. 30, 2015, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CIVIL DIV., https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/796866/download (Nov. 23, 2015) [hereinafter 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/8
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Health care providers now pay millions of dollars to settle allegations that 
they have committed health care fraud in violation of the FCA.8  
Among the anti-fraud laws at the government’s disposal, the FCA is the 
most imposing. Congress has described it as “one of the most potent civil 
tools for rooting out waste and fraud in Government.”9 Today, it has become 
the government’s “favorite weapon” to turn on health care fraud,10 and “has 
grown to assume almost mythical proportions in the fight against health care 
fraud.”11 One reason the FCA is so valuable to the government, and “a 
modern nightmare for the health care industry,”12 is that it carries the 
potential for especially large liability.13 Sanctions for violating the Act 
include treble damages14 and penalties of up to $21,563 per individual false 
 
 
DOJ, Fraud Statistics—Health and Human Services]. In 2015, the most recent year for which data are 
available, DOJ recovered $1.965 billion in health care fraud cases brought under the FCA. Id. This is 
down from $2.4 billion in 2014 and $2.7 billion in 2013. Id.  
 8. See, e.g., Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act: A Civil War Relic 
Evolves into a Modern Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REV. 455, 470 (1998) (providing examples of FCA health 
care settlements for $379 million, $255 million, and $182 million); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, 
Adventist Health System Agrees to Pay $115 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations (Sept. 21, 
2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/adventist-health-system-agrees-pay-115-million-settle-false-claims-
act-allegations; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Minnesota-Based Hospice Provider to Pay $18 Million 
for Alleged False Claims to Medicare for Patients Who Were Not Terminally Ill (July 13, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/minnesota-based-hospice-provider-pay-18-million-alleged-false-claims-
medicare-patients-who; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Nearly 500 Hospitals Pay United States More 
than $250 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations Related to Implantation of Cardiac Devices 
(Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nearly-500-hospitals-pay-united-states-more-250-
million-resolve-false-claims-act-allegations; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, South Carolina Hospital to 
Pay $17 Million to Resolve False Claims Act and Stark Law Allegations (July 28, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/south-carolina-hospital-pay-17-million-resolve-false-claims-act-and-
stark-law-allegations. 
 9. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 4 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 433. 
 10. Meador & Warren, supra note 8, at 456. 
 11. Joan H. Krause, “Promises to Keep”: Health Care Providers and the Civil False Claims Act, 
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363, 1415 (2002). 
 12. Meador & Warren, supra note 8, at 456. 
 13. See id. (“The False Claims Act is notable for its harsh penalties and damage provisions.”). 
United States v. Lorenzo, 768 F. Supp. 1127 (E.D. Pa. 1991), illustrates the rate at which the FCA can 
magnify liability in the health care arena. In that case, the defendant was a Philadelphia dentist who 
improperly billed Medicare 3,683 times for oral cancer screenings that he performed during standard 
dental examinations. Id. at 1129. From these claims, the dentist received $130,719.10. Id. The court 
awarded the United States $392,157.30 in treble damages, along with $18,415,000 in penalties (the 
defendant made 3,683 individual false claims, multiplied by the $5,000 per claim minimum penalty). Id. 
at 1133. In other words, the total monetary sanctions assessed against the dentist in this case equaled 
more than 140 times the amount of improper payments that he actually received from Medicare. See 
also Adam G. Snyder, The False Claims Act Applied to Health Care Institutions: Gearing Up for 
Corporate Compliance, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 8–9 (1996) (discussing the Lorenzo case and 
referring to it as a “classic False Claims action”).  
 14. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012) (A person who violates the FCA is liable for “3 times the amount 
of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person[.]”). 
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claim.15 Of even greater concern to the health care community, the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services may also exclude 
providers who violate the FCA from future participation in Medicare and 
Medicaid.16 Since providers depend on these programs for a sizable portion 
of their overall revenues,17 they have particular reason to fear exclusion.18 
Another powerful feature of the Act is its relatively unusual qui tam 
mechanism, whereby any private individual who becomes aware of fraud 
can bring suit on behalf of the government and recover a portion of the 
government’s award.19 Thus, even if the government does not know about 
a particular incident of health care fraud, the FCA’s qui tam function 
monetarily incentivizes any private individual who does know about it to 
come forward and sue the alleged fraudster. And in addition to the federal 
Act, in a majority of states providers may face prosecution under a state law 
version of the FCA too.20  
One way a health care provider can violate the FCA is to retain payments 
from Medicare or Medicaid to which the provider is not legally entitled.21 
Medicare and Medicaid work by reimbursing health care providers for 
services performed based on an established fee schedule.22 Providers submit 
 
 
 15. 28 C.F.R. § 85.5 (2016). For more on the size of penalties under the Act, see infra note 66.  
 16. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (2012); Golinkin II, supra note 4, at 302. 
 17. In 2006, Medicare payments accounted for 31% of the net revenues of U.S. hospitals. Uwe E. 
Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57, 
59 (2006).  
 18. See Golinkin II, supra note 4, at 302 (describing exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid as a 
“death sentence” for health care providers); David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private 
Enforcement: Empirical Analysis of DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 1689, 1713 (2013) (same). 
 19. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012). For more on the Act’s qui tam function, see infra notes 56–62 
and accompanying text. 
 20. Following the federal government’s lead, twenty-one states plus the District of Columbia have 
passed their own generally applicable versions of the FCA. Another eight have created “Medicaid only” 
false claims acts. States with False Claims Acts, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC. FUND, 
http://www.taf.org/states-false-claims-acts (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). In some states, the penalties are 
more onerous than under the federal FCA. For example, the Tennessee Medicaid False Claims Act 
allows treble damages plus penalties of up to $25,000 per claim. TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-182(a)(1) 
(2016). State and federal governments may each seek penalties and damages for the same false claims. 
For instance, in Kane ex rel. United States v. Healthfirst, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 3d 370, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), 
discussed infra in Part II, the United States sought treble damages plus an $11,000 penalty per false 
claim, while New York State sought treble damages plus $12,000 for each false claim. In addition to 
state false claims acts, New York City and Chicago also have their own municipal false claims statutes. 
Practice Tool 18 Survey of State False Claims Statutes with Qui Tam Provisions 3, 5 (Bloomberg Law 
Portfolio 2650: False Claims Act: Health Care Applications and Defense, Working Paper), 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/p/f90d8eac6ac34a9d780d0fee47e0b7c6/document/2760181288. 
 21. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G), (b)(3) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d) (2012). The details of 
how retention of Medicare or Medicaid overpayments can develop into FCA liability are discussed infra 
in Parts I.B and I.C. 
 22. See Blumenthal, Davis & Guterman, supra note 1, at 482; Allan S. Brett, New Guidelines for 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/8
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codes describing the services they have rendered, and Medicare or Medicaid 
reimburses the appropriate amount.23 If a provider submits the wrong code, 
it may receive more money than it is legally entitled to.24 When providers 
do this intentionally, it is known as “upcoding.”25 However, even if a 
provider is overpaid accidentally, once it realizes the mistake it violates the 
FCA unless it reports and returns the overpayment within a certain period 
of time.  
There is no doubt that intentional upcoding is a form of fraud. Similarly, 
it is clear that health care providers who realize they have been overpaid 
should return the money as soon as feasible. However, providers may not 
always know when they have been overpaid for the simple reason that 
correctly billing a Medicare or Medicaid claim can be quite difficult. 
Medicare in particular is, “to say the least, a complicated program.”26 The 
Medicare statute is more than 400 pages long, and its implementing 
regulations require another “1200 dense Code of Federal Regulations 
 
 
Coding Physicians’ Services—A Step Backward, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1705, 1705 (1998).  
 23. See Peter J. Carpentier, Note, The Risk of Getting Paid: Why ICD-10-CM May Increase 
Physician Liability Under the False Claims Act, 16 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 117, 120 (2013); United 
States v. Lakeshore Med. Clinic, Ltd., No. 11-CV-00892, 2013 WL 1307013, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 28, 
2013) (explaining the Medicare and Medicaid coding process). Technically, providers submit their 
Medicare claims to private contractors, who then reimburse the providers on behalf of Medicare. See 
New Eng. Deaconess Hosp. v. Sebelius, 942 F. Supp. 2d 56, 57–58 (D.D.C. 2013). As for Medicaid, 
states initially reimburse providers; then, the federal government partially reimburses the states for a 
portion of the fee, ranging from 50–74% depending on the state. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS & THE 
JOHN D. & CATHERINE T. MACARTHUR FOUND., STATE HEALTH CARE SPENDING ON MEDICAID 2 fig. 
1 (2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/data-visualizations/interactives/2014/medicaid/ 
downloadables/state_health_care_spending_on_medicaid.pdf.  
 24. Since the 1980s, American health care providers have used a coding system called ICD-9. 
Carpentier, supra note 23, at 122. The World Health Organization has recently introduced a new coding 
system, ICD-10, which includes far more specific codes than the old system. Id. at 122–23. As of 
October 1, 2015, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services requires providers to use ICD-10. R.J. 
Petrella, Opinion, Medical Query: Were You Struck by a Duck?, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/medical-query-were-you-struck-by-a-duck-1444776711. Among the 
roughly 70,000 codes included in ICD-10 are such amusingly hyper-specific ones as “struck by a duck,” 
“sucked into a jet engine,” and “burn due to water-skis on fire.” Id. Other absurdly specific codes include: 
“struck by orca, initial encounter”; “prolonged stay in weightless environment”; “passenger in heavy 
transport vehicle injured in collision with pedal cycle in traffic accident”; “bizarre personal appearance”; 
“hit or struck by falling object due to accident to merchant ship, initial encounter”; and “other contact 
with shark.” STRUCK BY ORCA: ICD-10 ILLUSTRATED (Niko Skievaski, ed. 2014). With this 
proliferation of new codes, providers have more opportunities to inadvertently select the wrong one. See 
Carpentier, supra note 23, at 138–39.  
 25. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 765 F.3d 914, 
916 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 26. Caring Hearts Pers. Home Servs., Inc. v. Burwell, 824 F.3d 968, 970 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, 
J.). For reasons why providers complain that Medicare is too complex, see Jost & Davies, supra note 4, 
at 261–64. 
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pages.”27 The Supreme Court has called Medicare a “massive, complex 
health and safety program . . . embodied in hundreds of pages of statutes 
and thousands of pages of often interrelated regulations,”28 while a district 
court has referred to the Medicare statute as “convoluted and complex” and 
a “model of un-clarity.”29 One commentator has called Medicare’s 
regulatory complexity “unrivaled anywhere in the world,” and noted that its 
regulations outnumber even those of the labyrinthine Internal Revenue 
Code.30 Perhaps in part because of this regulatory complexity, Medicare 
overpayments are far from uncommon: in fiscal year 2014 alone, the 
Recovery Audit Program discovered more than one million improper 
Medicare claims resulting in $2.39 billion in overpayments nationwide.31 
The previous year nearly 1.5 million improper Medicare claims led to $3.65 
billion in overpayments.32 While some of these improper claims may have 
been intentionally fraudulent, others were likely caused by “the complexity 
of the Medicare maze.”33  
As part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA),34 Congress enacted the so-
called “Sixty-Day Rule,”35 which requires providers to report and return all 
overpayments from Medicare or Medicaid within sixty days of when the 
 
 
 27. Jost & Davies, supra note 4, at 262. 
 28. Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000). See also Shalala v. 
Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 101 (1995) (referring to the “complex Medicare reimbursement 
process”); Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 683 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Medicare 
reimbursement scheme is quite complex . . . .”). 
 29. Estate of Urso v. Thompson, 309 F. Supp. 2d 253, 259 (D. Conn. 2004). 
 30. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Opinion, Medicare Can Turn Anyone Into a Crook, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 
2000), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB948408802553884631.  
 31. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., RECOVERY AUDITING IN MEDICARE FOR FISCAL 
YEAR 2014 13 tbl. 1 (2014), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-
Programs/Medicare-FFS-Compliance-Programs/Recovery-Audit-Program/Downloads/RAC-RTC-
FY2014.pdf. The National Recovery Audit Program is overseen by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services. Id. at iv. Its purpose is “to identify and correct Medicare and Medicaid improper payments.” 
Id. Individual audits in the program are conducted by private contractors known as Recovery Audit 
Contractors. Id. In 2014, the Recovery Audit Program also identified $173.1 million in underpayments 
that were subsequently given to providers. Id. at 13. 
 32. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., RECOVERY AUDITING IN MEDICARE FOR FISCAL 
YEAR 2013 11 tbl. 1 (2013), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-
Programs/Medicare-FFS-Compliance-Programs/Recovery-Audit-Program/Downloads/FY-2013-Report-
To-Congress.pdf. 
 33. Caring Hearts Pers. Home Servs., Inc. v. Burwell, 824 F.3d 968, 970 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, 
J.). See also Reinhardt, supra note 30 (arguing that, like the Internal Revenue Code, Medicare’s 
complexity “has the capacity to criminalize the behavior of perfectly decent citizens who would never 
willfully break rules, if they understood them”).  
 34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001 et seq. (2012).  
 35. For convenience, I refer to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(2)–(d)(3) (2012) collectively as the “Sixty-
Day Rule,” although this is not an official name. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/8
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overpayments are “identified.”36 Otherwise, the provider risks violating the 
FCA.37 However, the Sixty-Day Rule does not explain what it means for a 
particular overpayment to be “identified,”38 thus leaving it to the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to flesh out the precise meaning of 
that term.39 
A hospital submitting a large volume of Medicare and Medicaid claims 
is nearly certain to receive overpayments. For example, consider the results 
of three recent audits of prominent teaching hospitals, each involving 
Medicare claims selected because they were at risk for billing errors. First, 
in an audit of 240 Medicare Part A and B claims submitted by St. Louis’s 
Barnes Jewish Hospital40 primarily between 2009 and 2010, the Office of 
Inspector General (OIG) found that 58 claims had been overpaid, resulting 
in $725,185 in overpayments to the hospital.41 A similar audit at Chicago’s 
Northwestern Memorial Hospital42 revealed that 85 out of 171 Medicare 
claims sampled there were overpaid in 2011 and 2012, causing Medicare to 
overpay the hospital by $272,181.43 Finally, an audit of Medicare Part A 
and B claims submitted by Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital44 from 2009 
 
 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(2). 
 37. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(3). Specifically, the provider may be liable for a so-called 
“reverse false claim” under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G). The concept of a reverse false claim is explained 
infra in the text accompanying notes 85–90. Parts I.B and I.C., infra, elaborate further on how a provider 
violates the FCA by retaining Medicare or Medicaid overpayments.  
 38. See Kane ex rel. United States v. Healthfirst, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 3d 370, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(“Congress did not define the pivotal word ‘identified,’ which triggers the sixty-day report and return 
clock, in the text of the ACA.”). 
 39. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (explaining that if a statute 
is “ambiguous with respect to [a] specific issue,” courts should treat this as an implicit “legislative 
delegation” of that issue to the agency responsible for administering the statute). CMS is the executive 
agency charged with “administering the Medicare program and administering the Medicaid program in 
partnership with state governments.” Healthfirst, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 391 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395, 
1396).  
 40. Barnes Jewish is an affiliated teaching hospital of Washington University School of Medicine. 
About Us, BARNES JEWISH HOSP., http://www.barnesjewish.org/About-Us (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). 
 41. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, A-07-11-05014, 
MEDICARE COMPLIANCE REVIEW OF BARNES JEWISH HOSPITAL FOR CALENDAR YEARS 2009 AND 2010 
4 (2012), http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region7/71105014.pdf. Barnes Jewish submitted more than 
300,000 claims under Medicare Parts A and B in the period covered by the audit. Id. at 3. OIG selected 
the 240 audited claims because they were “potentially at risk for billing errors.” Id. 
 42. Northwestern Memorial is the 894-bed primary teaching hospital for Northwestern 
University’s Feinberg School of Medicine. It submitted more than 250,000 Medicare Part A and B 
claims during the relevant period. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR 
GENERAL, A-05-13-00051, MEDICARE COMPLIANCE REVIEW OF NORTHWESTERN MEMORIAL 
HOSPITAL FOR 2011 AND 2012 3 (2015), http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region5/51300051.pdf.  
 43. Id. OIG randomly selected the 171 audited claims from a larger group of 7,506 claims it had 
identified as “potentially at risk for billing errors.” Id.  
 44. A 396-bed teaching hospital located in Lebanon, NH and affiliated with Dartmouth College’s 
Geisel School of Medicine, Mary Hitchcock Memorial is part of the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Health 
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to 2012 revealed overpayments on 255 out of 445 sampled claims, totaling 
$770,735 in overpayments.45 
Consider the tremendous liability these hospitals could have faced if, 
hypothetically, a court was to determine they had “identified” these 
overpayments at some point more than sixty days before the OIG audits. To 
take the most extreme case, OIG’s audit of Mary Hitchcock found that 255 
out of 445 audited Medicare claims were improperly submitted, causing the 
government to overpay Mary Hitchcock by $770,735.46 If Mary Hitchcock 
retained this money for more than sixty days after “identifying” it, these 
overpayments might have cost the hospital $2,312,205 in FCA treble 
damages.47 On top of that, Mary Hitchcock might also have owed up to 
$21,563 in penalties per overpaid claim.48 If the maximum penalty were 
assessed for all 255 overpaid claims, Mary Hitchcock would have owed 
$5,498,565 in additional penalties, bringing the grand total to $7,810,770.49 
Of even more concern to Mary Hitchcock, it might also have faced 
exclusion from future participation in Medicare.50 In fact, Mary Hitchcock 
faced none of these sanctions—OIG merely recommended that the hospital 
refund the overpayments discovered by the audit and “strengthen controls 
to ensure full compliance with Medicare requirements.”51 But, continuing 
with the hypothetical assumption that Mary Hitchcock “identified” the 
 
 
System. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, A-01-13-00513, 
MEDICARE COMPLIANCE REVIEW OF MARY HITCHCOCK MEMORIAL HOSPITAL FOR 2009 THROUGH 
2012 2 (2015), http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region1/11300513.pdf. It submitted slightly over 400,000 
claims to Medicare Parts A and B during the period covered by the audit. Id.  
 45. Id. at 3. OIG randomly picked the 445 audited claims from a larger set of 86,143 claims that 
were “potentially at risk for billing errors.” Id.  
 46. Id. 
 47. Merely retaining the money more than sixty days after “identifying” it would not be enough 
on its own to violate the FCA. Mary Hitchcock would still need to meet the additional requirement of 
“knowingly conceal[ing] or knowingly and improperly avoid[ing]” its obligation to return the 
overpayments. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012). This requirement is discussed infra in Part I.C. 
 48. This would only be true if the violations occurred after November 2, 2015. If the violations 
occurred on or before November 2, 2015, the maximum penalty would be $11,000. See 28 C.F.R. § 85.5 
(2016); infra note 66. 
 49. Furthermore, OIG’s audit only covered 445 claims out of 86,143 that were “potentially at risk 
for billing errors.” MEDICARE COMPLIANCE REVIEW OF MARY HITCHCOCK MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, 
supra note 44, at 3. Assuming the overpayment rate of 57.3% (255/445) would hold constant across the 
entire set of 86,143 claims that OIG identified as “potentially at risk for billing errors,” this would result 
in approximately 49,360 overpaid claims. Again assuming the maximum penalty of $21,563 per 
overpaid claim, Mary Hitchcock would be hit with $1.064 billion in penalties alone, not to mention an 
additional $450 million in treble damages (assuming the amount of overpayment on the total 49,360 
claims would be proportional to the $770,735 in overpayments on the 255 confirmed overpaid claims). 
This ballooning liability is why the FCA keeps hospital compliance officers up at night.  
 50. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
 51. MEDICARE COMPLIANCE REVIEW OF MARY HITCHCOCK MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, supra note 44, 
at 7.  
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overpayments more than 60 days before the audit, if a prosecutor looking 
for a political score or a qui tam plaintiff looking for a payday had gotten 
there before OIG, Mary Hitchcock might have faced an FCA action with 
the potential for devastating liability. 
When a health care provider knows that particular claims were overpaid 
by particular amounts, there is no doubt the overpayments are “identified” 
within the meaning of the Sixty-Day Rule. But suppose instead that the 
provider is notified of a set of 1,000 claims that are at risk of having been 
overpaid, although no one knows with certainty which were actually 
overpaid, or by how much.52 There are three moments at which any actually 
overpaid claims in this set can become “identified.” First, the overpayments 
could be “identified” the moment the provider is put on notice that they 
might exist. Second, the overpayments could be deemed “identified” at the 
moment a reasonable investigation should have discovered and quantified 
the overpayments (even if, due to the provider’s failure to conduct a 
competent investigation, the overpayments have not yet in fact been 
discovered and quantified). Finally, overpayments could be deemed 
“identified” only when the provider has actual knowledge of both (a) which 
claims were overpaid, and (b) the amount of the overpayments.  
Under the first approach, the sixty-day clock would begin to run before 
the provider has even had a chance to begin its investigation. This may be 
an unfair result because, to determine which of the 1,000 flagged claims 
were actually overpaid, the provider would need to locate and review all 
relevant medical records, talk to the physicians who provided the services 
at issue, and then consult with coding experts (and possibly counsel) to 
determine whether the submitted codes were appropriate based on the 
supporting medical evidence.53 Under the second approach, too, the sixty-
day report and return clock may begin to run before a hospital on notice of 
potential overpayments knows what it actually needs to return. Only the 
third approach would not start the sixty-day clock until the provider knows 
for certain exactly how much it owes, and for which claims.  
This Note argues for the third approach, namely that overpaid Medicare 
and Medicaid claims should not be deemed “identified” until a health care 
 
 
 52. This is roughly the same problem that the defendant hospitals faced in Kane ex rel. United 
States v. Healthfirst, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 3d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). In Healthfirst, the defendant hospitals 
were given a list of more than 900 claims that were potentially overpaid, without knowing for sure that 
any particular claim had in fact been overpaid. Id. at 377. The Healthfirst case is discussed in depth infra 
in Part II. 
 53. This process is based on the Healthfirst defendants’ explanation of the review process they 
would undertake if presented with a large set of potentially overpaid Medicaid claims. See Healthfirst, 
120 F. Supp. 3d at 388–89.  
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provider has actual knowledge of their existence and amount. The Note is 
organized as follows: Part I introduces the relevant sources of law, including 
the FCA, the Sixty-Day Rule, and CMS’s regulations implementing the 
Sixty-Day Rule for Medicare. Part II describes a recent district court 
decision grappling with the proper interpretation of “identified” in the 
context of Medicaid overpayments, a situation in which none of CMS’s 
rules apply. Part III.A discusses how that case might be resolved if it dealt 
instead with claims under Medicare Part A or B, and thus were subject to 
CMS’s most recent regulation defining “identified.” Part III.B explains the 
problems with the existing regulatory scheme established by the FCA and 
current administrative interpretations of the Sixty-Day Rule. Part IV argues 
that providers should be required to have actual knowledge of overpayments 
for overpayments to be “identified.”  
I. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
& THE SIXTY-DAY RULE 
A. The False Claims Act: Theory and History 
The FCA is designed to punish and deter those who would defraud the 
federal government. Passed in 1863, the Act owes its existence to the Civil 
War, when sensational reports of fraud by military contractors jolted 
Congress into action to protect the public fisc.54 The essential problem the 
FCA is designed to combat is an informational one: because of the federal 
government’s size, the wide array of different programs it funds, and the 
fact that fraudsters generally act in secret, the government is unlikely to 
realize on its own when it has been duped.55  
 
 
 54. See, e.g., Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1996 
(2016); Krause, supra note 11, at 1369 (stating that Congress passed the FCA “in response to ‘rampant 
fraud’ perpetrated on the Union Army during the Civil War”); CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS 
ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT § 2:2 (2d ed. 2010) (“During the Civil War, outraged by 
extensive fraud against the Government by army contractors, Congress enacted the False Claims Act.”); 
id. § 2:6 (noting that the Civil War “produced extraordinary profits for dishonest government 
contractors”). Because of its Civil War roots, the Act is also known as the “Lincoln Law.” Id. Examples 
of the outrageous fraud committed by military contractors during the Civil War include: repeatedly 
reselling the same mules to Army quartermasters, selling the Navy ships with rotted hulls disguised by 
new paint jobs, selling the Army boots made of cardboard that lasted through only a mile of marching, 
and providing soldiers with uniforms made from old rags that disintegrated when wet. James B. Helmer, 
Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for Rogues, Privateers, Parasites and 
Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 1264 (2013).  
 55. SYLVIA, supra note 54, §§ 1:2, 1:4 (“A critical barrier to the Government’s efforts to control 
fraud is the lack of information about violations. Because fraud is secretive by nature, the Government 
cannot easily identify violations.”). See also id. § 1:2 (noting that “the risk of being caught defrauding 
the Government historically has remained relatively low”). Medicare overpayment is a good example of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/8
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The FCA addresses this problem in two basic ways. First, it uses a qui 
tam mechanism.56 This allows members of the general public, known as 
“relators,” to bring actions on behalf of the government for violations of the 
Act and to share in the government’s recovery.57 When a relator brings a qui 
tam action under the FCA, the government may investigate the case and 
“intervene,” meaning that it decides to handle the case instead of the 
relator.58 If the government exercises its option to intervene, it has “the 
primary responsibility for prosecuting the action,” and is not bound by any 
act of the relator.59 Currently, relators are entitled to between 15 and 30% 
of the government’s recovery.60 The successful relator gets 15–25% of the 
recovery if the government intervenes,61 and 25–30% if the government 
does not.62 Thus, the first way the Act seeks to solve the government’s 
information problem is by monetarily incentivizing private citizens who are 
aware of fraud against the government to bring it to the government’s 
attention.63  
 
 
why the government cannot easily tell when it has been defrauded. All the government knows about the 
services provided in a given hospital transaction is what the provider chooses to tell it. This will be 
reflected in the code(s) that the provider submits to Medicare. If this code does not accurately describe 
the services rendered, the government will not know unless it reviews the underlying medical 
documentation (or learns of the true nature of the services in some other way). However, in practice, the 
government does not possess the capacity to review the supporting medical documentation of most 
Medicare claims before paying. In fact, as of 2010, the government conducted pre-payment review of 
supporting documentation for only about .002% of all Medicare claims. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOVERY AUDITING AT THE CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVICES 2 (2011), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-
Programs/recovery-audit-program/downloads/fy2010reportcongress.pdf.  
 56. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012). “Qui tam” is short for “qui tam pro domino rege quam si ipso in 
hac parte sequitur”—literally, “who sues on behalf of the king as well as for himself.” Helmer, Jr., supra 
note 54, at 1262. As the term’s use of the word “king” suggests, the United States inherited the qui tam 
concept from England. Id. Although there is a “long tradition of qui tam actions in England and the 
American colonies,” Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000), 
qui tam provisions are fairly uncommon in the modern United States. In today’s United States Code, 
only three statutes other than the FCA allow relators to sue on behalf of the federal government, and 
they “address narrow subject matters and are rarely invoked.” SYLVIA, supra note 54, § 2:5.  
 57. See Helmer, Jr., supra note 54, at 1266.  
 58. SYLVIA, supra note 54, § 1:15.  
 59. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1). 
 60. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(2); Helmer, Jr., supra note 54, at 1273. 
 61. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). 
 62. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2). 
 63. See United States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 963 (9th Cir. 1995) (“It is commonly 
recognized that the central purpose of the qui tam provisions of the FCA is to ‘set up incentives to 
supplement government enforcement’ of the Act.” (quoting United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal 
Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994))). The False Claims Act’s chief sponsor in the 
Senate, Senator Jacob Merritt Howard of Michigan, anticipated that the Act would convince participants 
in fraud to tell on one another. As he explained it, the general idea is “setting a rogue to catch a rogue.” 
Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955–56 (1863). One early district court opinion famously and 
colorfully analogized qui tam relators to privateers, explaining that fraud cases prosecuted with the help 
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Second, the FCA deters fraud by imposing punitive sanctions on 
violators.64 Anyone who violates the Act is liable for treble damages plus 
civil monetary penalties.65 As adjusted for inflation, these penalties 
currently range from a minimum of $10,781 to a maximum of $21,563 per 
false claim.66 If the Act’s only goal were to make the government whole 
again after it has been defrauded, punitive damages and monetary penalties 
would be unnecessary. However, the FCA seeks to do more than simply 
compensate the federal government for losses sustained due to fraud—it 
also seeks to deter would-be fraudsters from committing fraud in the first 
place.67 The basic problem is that, when the likelihood of detection is low, 
fraudsters will realize the benefits of fraud more often than they will be 
sanctioned for it, and therefore fraud will generally be profitable.68 One 
solution is to increase the odds of apprehension (this is the point of the qui 
tam provisions). Another is to increase the penalty via punitive damages so 
that, if you are caught, the consequences are more onerous.69 Hopefully, at 
 
 
of qui tam relators “compare with the ordinary methods as the enterprising privateer does to the slow-
going public vessel.” United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885).  
 64. See United Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1996 (2016) 
(noting that liability under the FCA is “essentially punitive in nature”). 
 65. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1). 
 66. The FCA provides that a person may be liable “for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and 
not more than $10,000, as adjusted by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990.” Id. 
As adjusted for inflation, the current penalty per false claim ranges from a minimum of $10,781 to a 
maximum of $21,563. 28 C.F.R. § 85.5 (2016). The Department of Justice established the current 
penalties via an interim-final rule published on June 30, 2016. See Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation 
Adjustment, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,491 (June 30, 2016) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 20, 22, 36, 68, 71, 76, 
and 85). The new penalty amounts apply “only to civil penalties assessed after August 1, 2016, whose 
associated violations occurred after November 2, 2015.” Id. at 42,498. For FCA violations occurring on 
or before November 2, 2015, the minimum penalty is $5,500 and the maximum is $11,000. 28 C.F.R. 
§ 85.3(a)(9). When an agency issues an interim-final rule, it does so without the typical notice-and-
comment procedures beforehand. However, once the rule is already in place, the agency then solicits 
public comments and may amend the rule thereafter. See Michael Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making 
Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 703, 704 (1999).  
 67. See United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309 (1976) (stating that the False Claims Act 
“was originally aimed principally at stopping the massive frauds perpetrated by large contractors during 
the Civil War”) (emphasis added). 
 68. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. 
L. REV. 869, 873–74 (1998) (explaining that, when the likelihood of detection for a particular wrong is 
low, “the level of liability imposed on [wrongdoers] when they are found liable needs to exceed 
compensatory damages so that, on average, they will pay for the harm that they cause”; otherwise, failure 
to impose punitive damages “would result in inadequate deterrence”); see also Robert D. Cooter, 
Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1148 (1989) (“In the 
absence of punitive damages, enforcement errors enable injurers to externalize a portion of expected 
social costs that they cause.”). For a numerical example of what makes fraud too profitable when the 
apprehension rate is less than 100%, see infra note 70. 
 69. See SYLVIA, supra note 54, § 1:3 (“To the extent that individuals engage in fraud against the 
Government because it is profitable, the economic theory of law enforcement suggests that fraud can be 
reduced by making it more costly—in other words, by increasing the sanctions for the behavior. If 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/8
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a certain point, the sanctions for being caught will be severe enough to 
dissuade rational people from engaging in fraud, even though detection 
remains unlikely.70 Thus, by imposing punitive damages and significant 
monetary penalties, the FCA aims to deter fraud by making it unprofitable, 
even if the government struggles to detect fraud once it has been 
committed.71  
Although the Act was originally addressed to the problem of fraud in 
military contracting, the government soon found it to be useful in fighting 
 
 
individuals who violate the law are required to pay more than the actual harm they impose, the sanctions 
should have a deterrent effect, even if the risk of getting caught is low.”); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“Punitive Damages are . . . awarded against a person 
to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in 
the future.”) (emphasis added); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 217 (6th ed. 2003) 
(noting that “[p]unitive damages can be adjusted upward to take account of the difficulty of detection”); 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492, 494 (2008) (“[T]he consensus today is that punitives 
are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct. . . . [H]eavier 
punitive damage awards have been thought to be justifiable when wrongdoing is hard to detect 
(increasing chances of getting away with it) . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
 70. A simple example demonstrates the point: suppose that the risk of being caught for committing 
fraud is only 25%. If fraud is only punished with compensatory damages, then a rational person 
contemplating fraud might choose to defraud the government of $1,000, because there is no cost to him 
(even if he is caught, all he will have to do is return the $1,000), while the benefit is $750 (i.e., the benefit 
of getting away with it—$1,000 of profit—times the odds of getting away with it, 75%). If, however, 
the government imposes punitive quintuple damages for a fraud conviction, then the rational potential 
fraudster would refrain, because now the cost of committing fraud is $1,000 ($4,000—equal to $5,000 
in damages minus the $1,000 gained from fraud—multiplied by the 25% likelihood of being caught), 
while the benefit is still only $750. The general rule advanced by Law and Economics scholars is that 
the level of punitive damages necessary to achieve adequate deterrence is the reciprocal of the likelihood 
of apprehension, so that a 1/4 chance of being caught requires a punitive to compensatory damages ratio 
of at least 4:1 to adequately deter the undesirable action. See United States v. Rogan, 517 F.3d 449, 454 
(7th Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, C.J.) (“The lower the rate of a fraud’s detection, the higher the multiplier 
required to ensure that crime does not pay.”) (citation omitted); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 68, at 
887 (“[I]f a defendant can sometimes escape liability for the harm for which he is responsible, the proper 
magnitude of damages is the harm the defendant has caused, multiplied by a factor reflecting the 
probability of his escaping liability.”); Cooter, supra note 68, at 1148 (“In general, the punitive multiple 
should equal the reciprocal of the enforcement error for the sake of deterrence, which I call the ‘rule of 
the reciprocal.’”). Of course, there is an outer limit to this principle: if there is a 10% chance of being 
caught (or less), punitive damages of ten times the harm caused (or more) may violate federal due 
process. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (stating that “few 
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages . . . will satisfy due 
process”). 
 71. A further observation about the relationship between deterrence and detection: Because the 
FCA allows qui tam actions, any increase in the amount of damages available for violations of the Act 
will create correspondingly greater incentives for relators to file suit. See Margaret H. Lemos, Special 
Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 793 (2011) (noting that damage enhancements “encourage 
more private litigation by offering plaintiffs and their attorneys a larger recovery”). Thus, as damages 
increase, the likelihood that fraud will be exposed goes up in tandem. Policymakers need to keep this 
relationship in mind, or else they risk imposing liability that is more severe than necessary to achieve 
adequate deterrence.  
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other kinds of fraud against the government as well.72 In 1943, however, 
revisions to the Act seriously undermined its efficacy.73 The impetus for 
these amendments was the perception that the qui tam system was being 
abused. Of particular concern were so-called “parasitic” qui tam suits, 
where potential relators would “lurk in federal courthouses for criminal 
indictments to be brought against defense contractors [and] then 
immediately file a civil False Claims Act case based on the indictment 
against the same contractor.”74 These “parasitic” relators were not helping 
to solve the government’s information problem. Rather, they merely sought 
to turn an opportunistic profit from what little information the government 
did manage to collect. The 1943 amendments not only reduced the qui tam 
relator’s share of the recovery (thus decreasing the public’s financial 
incentive to notify the government of fraud),75 but also established a 
significant hurdle for relators to even make it past dismissal—if anyone in 
the government had any knowledge of the alleged fraud when the relator 
filed her action, the qui tam action would be dismissed.76  
Because of the 1943 amendments, the FCA fell into disuse during the 
mid-twentieth century.77 By the 1980s, however, fraud against the 
government was again on the rise, this time because of President Reagan’s 
massive Cold War military spending.78 This spike in fraud led Congress to 
pass the 1986 amendments, reinvigorating the dormant FCA.79 The 1986 
amendments accomplished this by, among other things, increasing the 
 
 
 72. See SYLVIA, supra note 54, § 2:6 (“Nothing in the [FCA] limited its reach to war supplies, and 
over time, the law was applied in other areas where large sums of federal money were dispensed.”). For 
instance, in Pooler v. United States, 127 F. 519, 519 (1st Cir. 1904), the government invoked the False 
Claims Act to recover wrongfully received pension funds.  
 73. See Helmer, Jr., supra note 54, at 1270 (stating that the 1943 amendments “destroyed qui tam 
as an effective fraud-fighting tool”). 
 74. Id. at 1267. 
 75. Under the original 1863 Act, relators were entitled to 50% of any recovery; the 1943 
Amendments decreased this figure to a maximum of 10% if the government intervened and prosecuted 
the case instead of the relator, and a maximum of 25% if the government elected not to intervene and 
allowed the relator to proceed on her own. Id. at 1266, 1271.  
 76. Id. at 1270.  
 77. In 1986, on the eve of the next round of FCA amendments, there was only one live qui tam 
case in the entire United States. Id. at 1272–73. See also SYLVIA, supra note 54, § 2:9 (“By the 1980s, 
it was evident that the False Claims Act was no longer an effective tool against fraud.”). 
 78. See Helmer, Jr., supra note 54, at 1271 (“In the 1980’s, President Reagan committed to a plan 
of enormous national defense spending. . . . The vast sums being spent by the Department of Defense 
presented opportunities to cheat the Government, which proved irresistible to many.”); SYLVIA, supra 
note 54, § 2:9 (“By the 1980s the magnitude of fraud against the Government had grown to previously 
unimaginable proportions.”). 
 79. See SYLVIA, supra note 54, § 2:2 (“In 1986, Congress amended the Act again to revitalize it 
and make it a more effective law enforcement tool.”). 
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financial incentives for qui tam relators to bring suit,80 increasing the 
magnitude of the penalties that could be recovered for each false claim, 
allowing victorious relators to recover attorney fees, and protecting relators 
from retaliation by their employers.81 The amendments also modified the 
stringent “any government knowledge” bar that had previously been such 
an imposing obstacle to qui tam suits, replacing it with a “public disclosure” 
exception that proved friendlier to relators.82 The public disclosure 
exception prevents a qui tam relator from bringing any action based on 
allegations previously disclosed (1) in a federal criminal, civil, or 
administrative hearing where the federal government is a party, (2) in a 
federal report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or (3) by the news media.83 
This exception has been “the most litigated provision of the 1986 False 
Claims Act.”84 
Importantly for purposes of this Note, the 1986 amendments also added 
the so-called “reverse” false claim to the government’s arsenal.85 Before 
these amendments, only “direct” false claims had been expressly 
authorized.86 A direct false claim is an attempt to fraudulently obtain 
payment from the government.87 This is the basic scenario where a 
contractor submits a bill to the government for goods he knows to be 
substandard, so as to fraudulently receive full payment from the 
 
 
 80. Under the 1986 Amendments (which remain in force today), a qui tam relator can recover 15–
25% of the total award if the United States prosecutes the case and 25–30% if the relator prosecutes it 
on her own. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. This was up from a maximum of 10% (if 
the government prosecuted) and 25% (if the relator prosecuted) under the 1943 Amendments. Helmer, 
Jr., supra note 54, at 1271. 
 81. Helmer, Jr., supra note 54, at 1273–74. 
 82. Id. at 1274.  
 83. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2012). 
 84. Helmer, Jr., supra note 54, at 1274. 
 85. Under the 1986 amendments, the “reverse” false claims provision was located at 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(a)(7). It is now codified at § 3729(a)(1)(G). Today, a person is liable under the reverse false 
claims provision when she  
knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to an 
obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or 
knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or 
property to the Government.  
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012). In its original 1986 form, the reverse false claims provision did not 
include the final clause, which was added in 2009 by the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act. See 
infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 86. Pre-1986, there was some disagreement among the courts as to whether the old statutory 
language permitted reverse false claims. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 15 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5280 (stating that the Justice Department “testified that recent court rulings had 
produced an ambiguity as to whether such ‘reverse false claims’ were covered by the [pre-1986] False 
Claims Act”). 
 87. As formulated today, a direct false claim occurs when a person “knowingly presents, or causes 
to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A).  
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government.88 In contrast, a reverse false claim is an attempt to fraudulently 
avoid payment to the government.89 Thus, the reverse fraudster already 
owes the government money, and fraudulently attempts to avoid paying 
some or all of it. An example may be helpful. Suppose that an oil company 
produces oil from government-owned lands, and therefore owes the 
government royalties. The amount of these royalties depends on how much 
oil the company produces from these public lands, as well as the price for 
which the oil sells. If the company purposely understates the price for which 
it is selling the oil to decrease the amount of royalties it owes the 
government, this is a reverse false claim.90 
Congress was not done after 1986. In 2009, the specter of fraud against 
the government again reappeared, and again Congress responded with new 
amendments to the FCA. This time, the identified threat was that 
subcontractors might defraud the government out of economic stimulus 
money dispensed in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.91 In response, 
Congress passed the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 
(FERA).92 FERA made two important changes to the FCA with implications 
 
 
 88. The direct false claim is the scenario the False Claims Act was originally designed to address—
the situation where, for example, a military contractor promises to provide good quality uniforms to the 
Army, but knows that he will in fact provide uniforms of such poor quality that they will dissolve when 
it rains, and then obtains full payment for those substandard goods from the government anyway. See 
Helmer, Jr., supra note 54, at 1264 (listing sale of defective uniforms that disintegrated when wet as one 
of the examples of Civil War fraud that galvanized Congress to pass the False Claims Act).  
 89. See SYLVIA, supra note 54, § 4:1 (“Congress added this so-called ‘reverse false claim’ 
provision in 1986 to clarify that fraudulent efforts to reduce payments to the Government were 
substantively indistinguishable from fraudulent efforts to obtain payments from the Government.”); S. 
REP. NO. 111-10, at 13–14 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 441 (explaining that a “reverse 
false claim” is so called “because it is designed to cover Government money or property that is 
knowingly retained by a person even though they have no right to it”). 
 90. This example is based on United States ex rel. Johnson v. Shell Oil Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 528, 
532 (E.D. Tex. 1999). 
 91. See S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 4 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 433 (“The 
effectiveness of the False Claims Act has recently been undermined by court decisions which limit the 
scope of the law and, in some cases, allow subcontractors paid with Government money to escape 
responsibility for proven frauds. The False Claims Act must be corrected and clarified in order to protect 
from fraud the Federal assistance and relief funds expended in response to our current economic crisis.”). 
The main purpose of the 2009 amendments was to overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in Allison 
Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662 (2008). See S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10 (2009), 
as reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 438 (“This section amends the FCA to clarify and correct 
erroneous interpretations of the law that were decided in Allison Engine . . . .”). In Allison Engine, the 
Court had held that when a subcontractor submits a fraudulent claim for payment to a contractor, it does 
not violate the FCA unless it intended for the government to pay the claim, as opposed to just the 
contractor. See Allison Engine, 553 U.S. at 671–72; S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10 (2009), reprinted in 2009 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 438. The chief aim of the 2009 amendments was to close this loophole for 
subcontractors “who knowingly submit false claims to general contractors and are paid with Government 
funds.” S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10–11 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 438. 
 92. Pub. L. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009). 
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for Medicare and Medicaid overpayments. First, FERA added a final clause 
to the reverse false claims provision, extending liability to anyone who 
“knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an 
obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government.”93 
Second, FERA defined the key term “obligation” to include “the retention 
of any overpayment.”94 FERA thus made clear that a health care provider 
can violate the FCA by retaining a Medicare or Medicaid overpayment.95 
Since 1986, the government has significantly increased its use of the 
FCA. While total FCA recoveries in 1987 totaled just $86.4 million,96 by 
1994 recoveries under the Act eclipsed $1 billion.97 Since 2000, total 
recoveries have fallen under $1 billion just once, and reached a record high 
of more than $5.7 billion in 2014.98 A record 754 qui tam actions were filed 
under the FCA in 2013,99 a far cry from the single qui tam suit that was 
pending when Congress took up the 1986 amendments.100  
Today, health care fraud is the single largest source of government 
recoveries under the FCA. Of the total $3,583,816,068 recovered by the 
government through FCA settlements and judgments in fiscal year 2015, 
more than half (just under $2 billion) came from health care cases.101 By 
contrast, FCA recoveries related to defense spending were just under $260 
million in that same year.102 Despite the FCA’s origins in defense fraud, 
health care fraud has now become the primary area of enforcement.103 
 
 
 93. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012). See also S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 13–14 (2009), reprinted in 
2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 441–442 (discussing this addition to § 3729(a)(1)(G)). 
 94. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(3) (defining “obligation” as an “established duty, whether or not fixed, 
arising from an express or implied contractual, grantor-grantee, or licensor-licensee relationship, from a 
fee-based or similar relationship, from statute or regulation, or from the retention of any overpayment”) 
(emphasis added). 
 95. See James J. Belanger & Scott M. Bennett, The Continued Expansion of the False Claims Act, 
4 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 26, 33 (“FERA amended the FCA so it would apply to the retention of an 
overpayment by the government.”). As explained further infra in Part I.C, to violate the FCA the 
provider would still need to “knowingly conceal” or “knowingly and improperly avoid” its obligation to 
return the overpayment. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G). 
 96. Fraud Statistics—Overview: Oct. 1, 1987–Sept. 30, 2015, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIV. 
(Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/796866/download [hereinafter DOJ, Fraud 
Statistics—Overview]. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. 
 100. See Helmer, Jr., supra note 54, at 1272–73 (noting that just one qui tam case was pending in 
the United States when Congress held hearings to discuss amendments to the FCA in 1986). 
 101. DOJ, Fraud Statistics—Overview, supra note 96; DOJ, Fraud Statistics—Health and Human 
Services, supra note 7.  
 102. Fraud Statistics—Dep’t of Defense: Oct. 1, 1987–Sept. 30, 2015, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL 
DIV. (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/796866/download. 
 103. See Helmer, Jr., supra note 54, at 1281 (“[M]assive fraud against the Medicare system has 
overshadowed defense cases brought pursuant to the False Claims Act.”); SYLVIA, supra note 54, § 2:15 
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B. The ACA’s Sixty-Day Rule and CMS’s Implementing Regulations 
The final piece of legislation in the Medicare and Medicaid overpayment 
jigsaw puzzle comes from the ACA. As part of the ACA, Congress passed 
the so-called “Sixty-Day Rule,” under which a provider who receives an 
overpayment must report and return it within “60 days after the date on 
which the overpayment was identified.”104 Otherwise, the overpayment 
constitutes an “obligation” for purposes of the FCA.105 
Significantly, however, Congress did not define the key term 
“identified.”106 This omission creates a problem when health care providers 
are notified that a particular set of Medicare or Medicaid claims potentially 
contains some overpayments: at what point are those overpayments 
“identified”? Once they are “identified,” the sixty-day clock starts to run, 
and each overpayment that is not returned by day sixty-one may cost the 
provider triple the amount of the overpayment plus up to $21,563 for a 
violation of the FCA. Plus, the provider may be cut off from further 
participation in the relevant program.107 The proper interpretation of the 
term “identified” is thus of no small importance to the provider 
community.108 
CMS has taken a piecemeal approach to clarifying when an overpayment 
is “identified.” In 2014, CMS issued a final rule defining “identified” only 
 
 
(noting that, since 1986, “the health care industry has gradually become the largest source of cases under 
the Act”); Krause, supra note 4, at 128–29 (describing the FCA as a “basic military fraud statute” that 
has since developed “into a multi-million dollar weapon against health care fraud”). 
 104. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(2) (2012) (emphasis added). The obligation of a provider to report 
and return overpayments is established in § 1320a-7k(d)(1). Then, § 1320a-7k(d)(2) provides the time 
limit within which an overpayment must be reported and returned: “An overpayment must be reported 
and returned under paragraph (1) by the later of—(A) the date which is 60 days after the date on which 
the overpayment was identified; or (B) the date any corresponding cost report is due, if applicable.” 
 105. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(3). Specifically, this provision states: “Any overpayment retained by 
a person after the deadline for reporting and returning the overpayment under paragraph (2) is an 
obligation (as defined in section 3729(b)(3) of title 31) for purposes of section 3729 of such title.” 
 106. See Kane ex rel. United States v. Healthfirst, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 3d 370, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(“Congress did not define the pivotal word ‘identified,’ which triggers the sixty-day report and return 
clock, in the text of the ACA.”); Belanger & Bennett, supra note 95, at 34 (“One large gap in [the ACA] 
is its failure to explain when an overpayment is identified. The term could incorporate an entire spectrum 
of mental states, ranging from actual knowledge of the overpayment, to simply having information that 
reasonably suggests there has been an overpayment. Because of the lack of specificity in [the ACA], 
how this provision will play out in the field remains to be seen.”). 
 107. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 108. See, e.g., Tyler Robinson & Roger R. Clayton, Rise of the “Reverse” False Claim & Proposed 
Rules from CMS on Reporting & Returning Overpayments, 23 IDC QUARTERLY, no. 4, Jan. 2014 
(recommending that, in the absence of an authoritative definition of “identified,” “providers should 
immediately institute policies and procedures to field any potential complaints with respect to potential 
Medicare overpayments”), http://www.iadtc.org/news/news.asp?id=152147. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/8
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for purposes of Medicare Parts C and D (the “C and D Rule”).109 Under the 
C and D Rule, an entity has “identified” an overpayment from Medicare 
Part C or D when it “has determined, or should have determined through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, that [it] has received an overpayment.”110  
CMS has also issued a separate final rule covering overpayments from 
Medicare Parts A and B (the “A and B Rule”). CMS first gave notice of its 
proposed A and B Rule in 2012, two years before it finalized the C and D 
Rule.111 Under the proposed A and B Rule, an overpayment would have 
been “identified” when a person (1) has “actual knowledge” of the 
overpayment, (2) acts in “reckless disregard” of the overpayment, or (3) acts 
in “deliberate ignorance” of the overpayment.112 As a policy justification for 
this interpretation, CMS explained that this interpretation would adequately 
incentivize health care providers to diligently report and return 
overpayments, whereas requiring actual knowledge of the overpayment 
might allow hospitals to avoid any obligation to repay by simply 
maintaining purposeful ignorance.113 
The proposed A and B Rule alarmed the provider community. The 
following comment by Asante Health System in Oregon was typical of 
provider sentiment:  
The proposed rule ignores what a credible and methodical process 
involves to determine if an overpayment was received. . . . [It] 
overlooks the fact-finding work a hospital must do, and the effort 
required to establish the scope of a problem, assess what happened 
and why, and determine the actual amount that is due.114  
Providers worried that CMS’s definition would mean they had “identified” 
overpayments when they were merely put on notice of a large set of 
potentially overpaid claims, and thus would only have sixty days to 
 
 
 109. 42 C.F.R. § 422.326(c) (2016) (Part C); 42 C.F.R. § 423.360(c) (2016) (Part D). 
 110. 42 C.F.R. § 422.326(c). See also 42 C.F.R. § 423.360(c) (same). 
 111. See Reporting and Returning of Overpayments, 77 Fed. Reg. 9179, 9180 (proposed Feb. 16, 
2012) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 401 and 405).  
 112. Id. In reaching this conclusion about the correct interpretation of “identified,” CMS reasoned 
that Congress’s reference to the term “knowing” in 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(4)(A) indicated Congress’s 
intent that the “knowing” standard should apply to define the term “identified,” which is located in a 
neighboring provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(2)(A). See id. at 9182. Section 1320a-7k(d)(4)(A) 
defines “knowing” by reference to that same term’s definition in the FCA. In the FCA, “knowing” is 
defined to include when a person has “actual knowledge” of information, or acts in “deliberate 
ignorance” or “reckless disregard” of the truth or falsity of information. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A) 
(2012). 
 113. Reporting and Returning of Overpayments, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9182. 
 114. Public Comment to CMS Proposed Rule, Asante Health System, at 4, 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2012-0020-0089.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
1314 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:1295 
 
 
 
 
complete an investigation into the overpayments, even if doing so were 
impracticable.115 Because not all overpayments are equally easy to sort 
out,116 providers argued that sixty days would not be sufficient to complete 
an investigation in all cases.117 Accordingly, many argued that 
overpayments should only be deemed “identified” once the provider has 
actual knowledge of them.118 Three years after issuing the proposed A and 
B Rule, CMS announced on February 17, 2015 that it would require an 
additional year before publishing the final A and B Rule due to “the 
complexity of the rule and scope of comments.”119  
After sifting through “approximately 200 timely pieces of 
correspondence,” CMS published the final A and B Rule on February 12, 
 
 
 115. For instance, Emory Healthcare in Atlanta complained that “[t]he proposed rule fails to 
recognize the wide variance in the nature and amount of potential overpayments to providers. 
Conducting a credible investigation to determine if an overpayment was received, and if so, the correct 
amount of the overpayment can, and often does, take much longer than 60 days.” Public Comment to 
CMS Proposed Rule, Emory Healthcare, at 2, https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CMS-2012-
0020-0152. The American Medical Association noted that “[p]hysicians who identify an initial 
overpayment are likely to inquire over the following days or weeks regarding the existence of other 
overpayments based on the same error. This will be a particularly laborious process for physicians who 
utilize external billing services and need to obtain records from third-parties.” Public Comment to CMS 
Proposed Rule, Am. Med. Ass’n, at 2, https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CMS-2012-0020-
0099. And the California Hospital Association added that  
[i]n certain situations, billing investigations could require the analysis of hundreds, or possibly 
thousands, of claims, often with some manual component to review and evaluate. Quantifying 
the overpayment within 60 days could be impossible if it stems from underlying decisions about 
medical necessity that can only be determined by review of the medical records.  
Public Comment to CMS Proposed Rule, Cal. Hosp. Ass’n, at 3, http://www.regulations.gov/ 
#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2012-0020-0085. 
 116. See Public Comment to CMS Proposed Rule, Husch Blackwell for Four State Health Care 
Provider Ass’ns, at 2, (“Overpayments come in different shapes and sizes. They may arise from data 
entry errors, lapses in documentation, faulty assumptions, incomplete information, incorrect agency 
guidance, and any number of other sources. They may be isolated or systemic. The dollars involved may 
be large or small.”), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CMS-2012-0020-0181. 
 117. Public Comment to CMS Proposed Rule, Cal. Hosp. Ass’n, supra note 115, at 3 (“Even 
assuming the provider has resolved to its satisfaction questions regarding the applicable underlying 
payment rules (which often are unclear or subject to differing interpretations), simply completing the 
analysis of the claims or medical records at issue may take longer than 60 days.”). 
 118. E.g., Public Comment to CMS Proposed Rule, Ariz. Hosp. and Healthcare Ass’n, at 1–2, 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CMS-2012-0020-0195; Public Comment to CMS Proposed 
Rule, Fed’n of Am. Hosps., at 6, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2012-0020-
0204.  
 119. Medicare Program; Reporting and Returning of Overpayments; Extension of Timeline for 
Publication of the Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 8247 (Feb. 17, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 401 
and 405). The Social Security Act requires CMS to provide notice if it requires more than three years 
from the date on which it issued a proposed rule to publish the final rule. Id. at 8247. In explaining its 
decision to take another year to consider the final rule, CMS stated that “[b]ased on both public 
comments received and internal stakeholder feedback, we have determined that there are significant 
policy and operational issues that need to be resolved in order to address all of the issues raised by 
comments to the proposed rule.” Id. at 8248. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/8
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2016.120 The final rule differs from the proposed rule, providing that  
[a] person has identified an overpayment when the person has, or 
should have through the exercise of reasonable diligence, determined 
that the person has received an overpayment and quantified the 
amount of the overpayment. A person should have determined that 
the person received an overpayment and quantified the amount of the 
overpayment if the person fails to exercise reasonable diligence and 
the person in fact received an overpayment.121 
The final A and B Rule further explained that a provider has exercised 
“reasonable diligence” when, “in response to obtaining credible information 
of a potential overpayment,” the provider assigns “qualified individuals” to 
conduct an investigation “in good faith and in a timely manner.”122 Unlike 
the C and D Rule, the A and B Rule at least requires that a reasonably 
diligent provider would have been able to quantify any overpayments before 
they are “identified,” not just determine that they exist. However, neither 
the A and B Rule nor the C and D Rule predicates “identification” on the 
provider’s actual knowledge of the overpayments. Instead, it is enough that 
a “reasonably diligent” provider would have been able to determine that it 
received overpayments (under the C and D Rule), or that such a provider 
would have been able to both determine that the overpayments exist and 
quantify them (under the A and B Rule), even if the provider in question has 
not actually done so.  
Neither the A and B Rule nor the C and D Rule applies to Medicaid 
overpayments. As of the writing of this Note, CMS has not published a rule 
defining “identified” for purposes of Medicaid.123 In Part II, I discuss the 
first court decision to interpret “identified” in the context of Medicaid 
overpayments, and thus without controlling regulatory guidance from CMS.  
C. Structure of a Reverse False Claim in the Medicare/Medicaid 
Overpayment Context 
The above material described the FCA and the Sixty-Day Rule in 
isolation from one another. But how do they interact to turn an overpayment 
 
 
 120. See Reporting and Returning of Overpayments, 81 Fed. Reg. 7654, 7655 (Feb. 12, 2016) (to 
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 401 and 405). 
 121. 42 C.F.R. § 401.305(a)(2) (2016). 
 122. Reporting and Returning of Overpayments, 81 Fed. Reg. at 7661. Another component of 
“reasonable diligence” is “proactive compliance activities conducted in good faith by qualified 
individuals to monitor for the receipt of overpayments.” Id.  
 123. See id. at 7655 (“No final rule has been published that addresses Medicaid requirements.”). 
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of Medicare or Medicaid funds into FCA liability? The foundation of a 
reverse false claim is what is known as an “obligation.” The FCA provides 
that a defendant is liable for a reverse false claim only when it “knowingly 
conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to 
pay or transmit money or property to the Government.”124 Without an 
obligation there can be no liability. How is an obligation acquired? In the 
Sixty-Day Rule, Congress established particular circumstances under which 
the mere retention of improper Medicare or Medicaid payments creates an 
obligation. Specifically, the Sixty-Day Rule provides that failure to report 
and return a Medicare or Medicaid overpayment within sixty days from the 
date on which the overpayment is “identified” produces an obligation.125 
Once a defendant acquires an obligation, the FCA does not impose 
liability unless the defendant “knowingly conceals” or “knowingly and 
improperly avoids or decreases” the obligation.126 To act “knowingly” with 
regard to a particular piece of information, a defendant must act (i) with 
“actual knowledge” of the information, (ii) in “deliberate ignorance” of the 
information’s truth or falsity, or (iii) in “reckless disregard” of the 
information’s truth or falsity.127 The defendant need not have any “specific 
intent to defraud.”128 Because the FCA itself prescribes this step of the 
analysis, it is the same regardless of whether the A and B Rule, C and D 
Rule, or no rule applies. In other words, CMS’s rules affect when a provider 
acquires an obligation, but not how that obligation turns into FCA liability. 
II. THE HEALTHFIRST DECISION 
In Kane ex rel. United States v. Healthfirst, Inc.,129 the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York considered whether 
several hospitals had “identified” potential Medicaid overpayments for 
purposes of the Sixty-Day Rule and the FCA. Healthfirst is noteworthy as 
the first case to interpret the term “identified.”130 Because Healthfirst was a 
Medicaid case, its outcome was not (and would not now be) controlled by 
either the A and B or C and D Rule.131 
 
 
 124. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 125. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(2) (2012). 
 126. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G). 
 127. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A). 
 128. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(B).  
 129. 120 F. Supp. 3d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 130. See id. at 384 (“Congress did not define the term ‘identified’ in the ACA, and no other court 
has weighed in on its meaning or on the application of the ACA sixty-day rule. This case thus presents 
a novel question of statutory interpretation.”). 
 131. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] WRONGLY “IDENTIFIED” 1317 
 
 
 
 
A. The Facts132 
The Healthfirst defendants were several New York City hospitals133 
(“the Hospitals”), which, due to a software glitch, received Medicaid 
overpayments from the New York State Department of Health.134 The 
Hospitals had a contractual agreement with Healthfirst (a private, non-profit 
insurance program), whereby the Hospitals provided care to Medicaid 
patients covered by Healthfirst’s insurance, and Healthfirst then 
compensated the Hospitals for their services.135 Healthfirst, in turn, received 
a monthly reimbursement fee from the New York State Department of 
Health for its Medicaid-covered patients.136  
When Healthfirst paid the Hospitals, it also sent them an electronic code 
indicating whether the Hospitals could pursue further payment from a 
secondary payor (like Medicare or Medicaid).137 The Hospitals’ problems 
began when a glitch in Healthfirst’s billing software caused Healthfirst to 
send codes to the Hospitals that incorrectly told the Hospitals they could 
seek additional payment from Medicaid.138 Consequently, the Hospitals 
improperly submitted Medicaid claims to the New York State Department 
of Health, resulting in the Hospitals’ receiving Medicaid payments to which 
they were not entitled.139  
The Hospitals began receiving overpayments in January 2009, but did 
 
 
 132. Because Healthfirst arose on a motion to dismiss, the court accepted as true the factual 
background alleged in the United States’ and New York’s complaints for purposes of ruling on the 
motion. See Healthfirst, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 375 n.2 (noting that the facts of the case came from the 
complaints filed by the United States and New York, and that the two complaints contained facts that 
were “virtually, if not completely, identical”). 
 133. The hospitals involved in the case were Beth Israel Medical Center d/b/a Mount Sinai Beth 
Israel, St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center d/b/a Mount Sinai St. Luke’s and Mount Sinai Roosevelt, 
and Long Island College Hospital. Id. at 375. The three hospitals all belonged to Continuum Health 
Partners, a network of non-profit hospitals. Id. at 375–76. In July 2013, Continuum Health Partners 
combined with Mount Sinai Medical Center to form the Mount Sinai Health System. See Anemona 
Hartocollis, 2 Hospital Networks Agree to Merge, Raising Specter of Costlier Care, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 
16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/17/nyregion/2-hospital-networks-agree-to-merge-raising-
specter-of-costlier-care.html?_r=0. See also Healthfirst, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 376 n.5 (discussing the 
merger). In the interest of full disclosure, my mother is an attorney for Mount Sinai, although she was 
not involved with the Healthfirst litigation and she did not share any non-public information about the 
case with me. This disclosure is repeated at the end of the Note in my author acknowledgments.  
 134. Healthfirst, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 376–77. 
 135. Id. at 376. 
 136. Id. Recall that Medicaid expenses are shared between the states and the federal government. 
States pay providers first, and then are partially reimbursed by the federal government. See supra notes 
2 and 23.  
 137. Healthfirst, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 376.  
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. at 376–77. 
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not suspect anything was amiss until September 2010 when auditors with 
the New York State Comptroller’s office noticed the potential problem and 
brought it to the Hospitals’ attention.140 Upon investigation, the parties 
discovered the software malfunction that had caused the overpayments.141 
The Hospitals then assigned an employee, Robert Kane, to determine which 
claims had been improperly submitted.142 On February 4, 2011, Kane 
emailed a spreadsheet to the Hospitals containing more than 900 claims that 
had the problematic billing code and therefore might have been overpaid.143 
According to the Hospitals, at this point a rigorous and time-consuming 
review was necessary to determine what claims had actually been overpaid. 
The Hospitals described this review process as follows:  
Faced with an internal audit that suggests that some percentage of 
sampled claims for certain procedures have been improperly coded, 
a provider would likely review the findings by retrieving and 
reviewing the medical records involved, discussing the cases with the 
physicians who furnished the services, and consulting with staff with 
expertise in coding and, possibly, counsel. If the review confirms the 
audit determination, there may be a need to extend the audit to review 
claims outside of the audit sample or to do more sampling from 
different time periods or different physicians. . . . Assuming that the 
audit identified overpayments, the provider’s reimbursement staff 
will then have to make arrangements to return the overpayments. 
Doing so may require the identification of every specific claim that 
has been overpaid by claim number, additional governmental 
identifiers, date of service, patient, and amount billed and paid.144  
Four days after receiving the spreadsheet, the Hospitals fired Kane.145 While 
the Hospitals promptly repaid five of the improper claims, they did not 
reimburse the government for more than 300 of the claims until June of 
2012, after the government had issued a Civil Investigative Demand.146 
 
 
 140. Id. at 377. 
 141. Id. The glitch was fixed on December 13, 2010. Id.  
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 388–89 (quoting Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss 
the Government’s Complaint, at 10–11). For other hospitals’ corroborations of the difficulty of 
conducting an investigation into potential overpayments, see supra note 115. 
 145. Healthfirst, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 377.  
 146. Id. at 377–78. The Civil Investigative Demand is a tool by which the government can force 
entities under investigation for FCA violations to produce relevant information and testimony. See 
CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40785, QUI TAM: THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RELATED 
FEDERAL STATUTES 19 (2009).  
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Ultimately, it turned out that roughly half the claims in Kane’s spreadsheet 
had in fact been overpaid.147 
On April 5, 2011, Kane filed a qui tam action against the Hospitals and 
Healthfirst (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging they violated the federal 
FCA, as well as its New York and New Jersey state analogues,148 by failing 
to report and return the Medicaid overpayments included in his spreadsheet 
within the appropriate amount of time.149 Both the United States and New 
York elected to intervene in June 2012.150 The United States sought treble 
damages plus an $11,000 penalty for each overpayment, while New York 
sought even more—treble damages plus a $12,000 penalty per 
overpayment.151 Defendants moved to dismiss both the United States’ and 
New York’s Intervenor-Complaints on September 22, 2014.152  
B. The Court’s Analysis 
The federal government argued that the Hospitals were liable under the 
FCA for reverse false claims.153 Specifically, the government alleged that 
Kane’s spreadsheet was alone sufficient to “identify” any overpayments 
contained therein simply because it put the Hospitals on notice of potential 
overpayments.154 In the government’s view, the Hospitals acquired an FCA 
obligation when they failed to report and return the listed overpayments 
within sixty days of receiving Kane’s email.155 To complete the Hospitals’ 
FCA liability, the government argued that the Hospitals knowingly and 
improperly “avoided” their obligation by failing to follow up on Kane’s 
 
 
 147. Healthfirst, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 383. 
 148. The New York State False Claims Act can be found at N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW §§ 187 et seq. 
(McKinney 2016). The New Jersey False Claims Act is set forth at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:32C-1 et seq. 
(West 2016).  
 149. Healthfirst, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 378. 
 150. Id. The Healthfirst case is notable because it is the first time the government elected to 
intervene in an FCA suit predicated upon a violation of the Sixty-Day Rule. Scott R. Grubman, Playing 
Hot Potato with Overpayments: Health Care Providers Must Act Quickly to Refund Overpayments or 
Risk FCA Liability, AHLA CONNECTIONS, May 2015, at 18.  
 151. Healthfirst, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 379. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 378. The FCA’s reverse false claims provision is 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G). See supra 
note 85 and accompanying text (discussing § 3729(a)(1)(G)). New York State also argued that the 
Hospitals violated the New York False Claims Act’s analogous reverse false claims provision. 
Healthfirst, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 378. 
 154. Healthfirst, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 383. See also id. at 389 (noting that “[u]nder the definition of 
‘identified’ proposed by the Government” the sixty-day clock begins to run once a provider is “put on 
notice of potential overpayments”). 
 155. Id. at 383. 
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spreadsheet.156 The Hospitals, in turn, argued that only overpayments of 
which they had actual knowledge should be deemed “identified,” and that 
Kane’s email was therefore insufficient to “identify” any overpayments 
because it at most indicated that all the listed claims were potentially 
overpaid, but did not definitively determine that any particular claim was in 
fact overpaid.157 Thus, the court had to determine what Congress intended 
“identified” to mean in this context. 
The court first concluded that the term “identified” “has no ‘plain 
meaning’ as it is used in the ACA.”158 Next, the court considered the 
legislative history of both the ACA and FERA. The Hospitals pointed to the 
fact that, in the ACA’s initial incarnation in the House of Representatives, 
the Sixty-Day Rule’s predecessor had required “known” (as opposed to 
“identified”) overpayments to be reported and returned within sixty days.159 
As discussed previously, “known” has a specific meaning in the FCA, 
which incorporates both recklessness and deliberate ignorance.160 
Therefore, the Hospitals argued, Congress must have intended for 
“identified” to mean something different from “known” as it is used in the 
FCA, otherwise it would not have made the substitution.161 From there, the 
Hospitals concluded that Congress must have used the term “identified” 
rather than “known” for the purpose of “exempt[ing] from FCA liability 
those healthcare providers who recklessly fail to uncover or remain 
deliberately ignorant of an overpayment.”162 In other words, the Hospitals 
argued that Congress’s conscious use of “identified” in place of “known” 
meant that providers must have actual knowledge of overpayments before 
the sixty-day clock starts. 
The court rejected the Hospitals’ argument, finding legislative history 
from FERA to be more persuasive proof of congressional intent. The court 
focused in particular on a Senate Judiciary Committee report on FERA, 
which stated that an FCA obligation should exist “‘where there is a 
relationship between the Government and a person that results in a duty to 
pay the Government money, whether or not the amount owed is yet 
 
 
 156. Id. at 393. 
 157. Id. at 384. 
 158. Id. at 385. The court looked to the dictionary for definitions of “identify,” and determined that 
it is “susceptible to more than one meaning.” Id. at 384–85.  
 159. Id. at 386. 
 160. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1) (2012); supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text (discussing the 
meaning of “knowing” in the FCA). 
 161. Healthfirst, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 386. 
 162. Id. 
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fixed.’”163 From this, the court concluded that Congress intended 
overpayments to be “identified” so long as “there is an established duty to 
pay money to the government, even if the precise amount due has yet to be 
determined.”164 Because the Hospitals had been placed on notice that some 
of the claims in Kane’s spreadsheet had likely been overpaid, the court 
concluded those overpayments were immediately “identified” even though 
the Hospitals could not have known yet which had in fact been overpaid.165 
The Hospitals protested that this interpretation of “identified” would 
produce an absurd result, in that it would subject the Hospitals to the 
“unworkable burden” of having to complete investigations into all of the 
900-plus potentially overpaid claims included in Kane’s spreadsheet within 
sixty days of receiving his email.166 In particular, the Hospitals emphasized 
the rigorous review that would be needed to confirm each potential 
overpayment as an actual overpayment.167 The court acknowledged that 
asking the Hospitals to repeat such a lengthy process more than 900 times 
over the course of sixty days could impose a “demanding standard of 
compliance . . . especially in light of the penalties and damages available 
under the FCA.”168 The court also conceded that a hospital might try its 
hardest to report and return all overpayments within sixty days of being put 
on notice, yet still fail and acquire an obligation.169  
Despite these apparent and “potentially unworkable” burdens,170 the 
court identified two reasons why it was willing to impose such an exacting 
standard on health care providers. First, the court noted that an FCA 
“obligation” does not automatically mean FCA liability; rather, even if a 
hospital reaches day sixty-one without returning an overpayment, the 
hospital must still do something more (i.e., “knowingly conceal” or 
“knowingly and improperly avoid or decrease” the obligation) to become 
 
 
 163. Healthfirst, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 388 (quoting S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 14 (2009), reprinted in 
2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 441). Even conceding that the legislative history of a statute may be used to 
interpret terms within that same statute (which some do not, see, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. 
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 56 (2012)), it stretches the concept of 
legislative history awfully thin to do what the court is doing here: using the legislative history of Statute 
A (FERA) to interpret a term contained in Statute B (the ACA).  
 164. Healthfirst, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 388 (emphasis added). 
 165. See id. (“Here, after the Comptroller alerted Defendants to the software glitch and approached 
them with specific wrongful claims, and after Kane put Defendants on notice of a set of claims likely to 
contain numerous overpayments, Defendants had an established duty to report and return wrongly 
collected money.”). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 388–89. This review process was described supra in the text accompanying note 144. 
 168. Healthfirst, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 389. 
 169. Id.  
 170. Id. at 390. 
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liable under the FCA.171 In cases involving “well-intentioned healthcare 
providers working with reasonable haste to address erroneous 
overpayments,” the court argued that “prosecutorial discretion would 
counsel against the institution of enforcement actions,” because such actions 
would be “inconsistent with the spirit of the law and would be unlikely to 
succeed.”172 This is really two separate arguments in one: (a) that a hospital 
making an earnest attempt at repayment is unlikely to have acted with the 
requisite scienter to sustain FCA liability; and (b) that prosecutors can 
generally be trusted not to bring weak cases. I criticize these arguments 
below, the former in Part III.A and the latter in Part III.B.3. 
Second, the court offered a more forceful policy argument against 
requiring actual knowledge of overpayments for them to be “identified”—
namely, that doing so would disincentivize hospitals from conducting any 
investigation at all after receiving an email like Kane’s because, by never 
even attempting to gain actual knowledge, hospitals could dodge FCA 
liability while permanently retaining overpayments.173 I refer to this as the 
“ostrich argument” because those who make it fear that, under an actual 
knowledge standard, providers would act like the proverbial ostriches and 
“bury their heads in the sand” to avoid learning of overpayments.174 CMS 
used the ostrich argument to defend its decision not to adopt an actual 
knowledge standard, suggesting that providers might then “avoid 
performing activities to determine whether an overpayment exists, such as 
self-audits, compliance checks, and other additional research.”175 Another 
district court has also raised this policy concern in the context of a Medicare 
overpayment FCA case.176 I respond to the ostrich argument infra in Part 
IV.177  
 
 
 171. Id. at 389. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. at 390.  
 174. See id. (referring to a healthcare provider that tries to avoid learning about overpayments to 
stave off FCA liability as “putting its head in the sand”); 132 CONG. REC. H9382-03 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 
1986) (statement of Rep. Berman) (stating that the term “reckless disregard” is “intended to reach the 
‘ostrich-with-his-head-in-the-sand’ problem where government contractors hide behind the fact that they 
were not personally aware that such overcharges may have occurred”). The notion that ostriches bury 
their heads in the sand when threatened is apocryphal. They actually fall down and remain still so that 
their light-colored heads camouflage with the ground. See Ostrich, SAN DIEGO ZOO, 
http://animals.sandiegozoo.org/animals/ostrich (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). 
 175. Reporting and Returning of Overpayments, 77 Fed. Reg. 9179, 9182 (proposed Feb. 16, 2012). 
 176. United States v. Lakeshore Med. Clinic, Ltd., No. 11-CV-00892, 2013 WL 1307013, at *4 
(E.D. Wis. Mar. 28, 2013) (“If the government overpaid defendant for [evaluation and management] 
services and defendant intentionally refused to investigate the possibility that it was overpaid, it may 
have unlawfully avoided an obligation to pay money to the government.”). 
 177. In addition to these two main arguments, the court also noted that it considered but “d[id] not 
place significant weight upon” CMS’s proposed rule for Medicare Parts A and B, as well as CMS’s final 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/8
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After the court established that the overpayments had been “identified” 
for purposes of the Sixty-Day Rule, the court went on to conclude that the 
government had successfully alleged the Hospitals knowingly and 
improperly avoided the resulting obligation.178 Thus, the government’s 
pleadings, accepted as true, survived the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.179  
In sum, Healthfirst imposes a burden on providers that the court itself 
acknowledges may be difficult (or sometimes impossible) to meet, and 
threatens failure to meet this burden with the possibility of severe FCA 
liability. It does so because, in the court’s view, (a) the legislative history of 
FERA compels this result; (b) well-intentioned hospitals will likely not have 
acted with the scienter necessary for FCA liability; (c) prosecutors can be 
trusted not to pursue weak cases; and (d) otherwise, providers might avoid 
repaying by putting their heads in the sand. This opinion was the only one 
generated by the Healthfirst litigation, because one year after the court 
denied the Hospitals’ motion to dismiss, they agreed to pay the government 
$2.95 million to settle the case.180 
III. DISCUSSION 
In this Part of the Note, I first discuss in Section A how a provider in a 
situation similar to that of the Healthfirst Hospitals could acquire an 
obligation if the A and B Rule applied. Next, in Section B I discuss three 
problems with the existing regulatory standards for when overpayments are 
“identified.”  
 
 
rule for Medicare Parts C and D. See Healthfirst, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 391–393. Neither of these rules 
require actual knowledge of an overpayment for it to be “identified.” See supra notes 109–12 and 
accompanying text. The court observed that, although these rules were without legal effect as to 
overpayment of Medicaid claims, still its conclusion was “at least consistent” with CMS’s Medicare 
rules. Healthfirst, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 393. So while none of CMS’s rules would be directly controlling 
on a court faced with the same issue today, as here, they would likely be persuasive. 
 178. Healthfirst, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 393–95. The court found that “the plain meaning of ‘avoid’ 
includes behavior where an individual is put on notice of a potential issue, is legally obligated to address 
it, and does nothing.” Id. at 394. Because the government alleged that Kane’s spreadsheet put the 
Hospitals on notice of potential overpayments, and that the Hospitals then “did nothing further with 
[Kane’s] analysis,” this showing satisfied the government’s obligation to plead “avoidance.” Id. The 
court then reasoned that this avoidance was “knowing,” based on: (a) the proposition that knowledge 
“may be alleged generally rather than with particularity” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b); 
and (b) the bare conclusion that the Government had pleaded facts “consistent with recklessness or 
deliberate ignorance, not merely negligence.” Id. at 395.  
 179. Id. at 400. 
 180. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces $2.95 Million Settlement 
With Hospital Group For Improperly Delaying Repayment Of Medicaid Funds (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-295-million-settlement-hospital-
group-improperly. 
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A. Applying the A and B Rule to Healthfirst 
Healthfirst was a Medicaid case, meaning that none of CMS’s rules 
applied. But how would a case with facts similar to Healthfirst be decided 
under the A and B Rule? In other words, might the A and B Rule create an 
obligation in the situation where someone notifies a provider of a set of 
Medicare Part A and B claims containing some that were probably overpaid, 
but the provider has not yet determined which, if any, were actually 
overpaid?  
Recall that, under the A and B Rule, overpayments are identified when 
a provider “has, or should have through the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
determined that the [provider] has received an overpayment and quantified 
the amount of the overpayment.”181 The rule goes on to clarify that a 
provider should have both determined that it received an overpayment and 
quantified the overpayment “if the [provider] fails to exercise reasonable 
diligence and the [provider] in fact received an overpayment.”182 
Furthermore, the rule explains that, to act with “reasonable diligence,” a 
provider that receives “credible information of a potential overpayment” 
must assign “qualified individuals” to investigate the possibility of 
overpayment “in good faith and in a timely manner.”183 Therefore, if a 
provider fails to conduct an investigation “in good faith and in a timely 
manner” in response to receiving credible information about potential 
overpayments, the A and B Rule says the provider should have determined 
it received overpayments and quantified them, and thus deems the provider 
to have “identified” overpayments even if it lacks actual knowledge of 
which claims were overpaid and by how much. 
It is not hard to see how a provider in the position of the Healthfirst 
Hospitals could “identify” overpayments under the A and B Rule, even if 
the provider (a) did not actually determine which were overpaid and by how 
much; and (b) believed it was conducting an adequate investigation in 
response to being notified of possible overpayments. Upon receiving a 
credible tip about a set of potentially overpaid Medicare Part A and/or B 
claims (like Kane’s spreadsheet), the provider would then have to assign 
“qualified individuals” to conduct an investigation “in good faith and in a 
timely manner.” This standard leaves a lot of room for the government to 
challenge the hospital’s investigation after the fact if it winds up taking 
 
 
 181. 42 C.F.R. § 401.305(a)(2) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Reporting and Returning of Overpayments, 81 Fed. Reg. 7654, 7661 (Feb. 12, 2016) (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 401 and 405). 
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longer than expected. For instance, the government (or a relator) might later 
dispute whether the people the hospital put in charge of the inquiry were 
actually “qualified.” There might also be questions about whether the 
hospital’s investigation was done “in good faith” and “in a timely manner.” 
Presumably, if a hospital does literally everything within its power to 
expedite the investigation it will not get an obligation until it has actually 
quantified the amount of the overpayment. But there is a lot of gray area 
between a model hospital and a hospital that totally refuses to investigate. 
For example, a hospital might wait a few days or a week before beginning 
its investigation. Does such a delay make the hospital’s investigation not 
“timely” or not in “good faith”? What if instead of waiting some amount of 
time before beginning its investigation, the hospital elects not to commit as 
much manpower to the investigation as the government or a relator claims 
it should have? Courts may have to decide cases where the government 
claims an investigation was not “timely” because the hospital committed 
only five employees when it should have assigned ten. Or perhaps the 
employees will have only worked twenty hours a week on the investigation 
when the government thinks a “timely” investigation would have required 
forty hours per week.  
The point here is not to answer these difficult line-drawing questions. I 
merely aim to illustrate that the A and B Rule leaves the government and 
relators a lot of room to argue that a hospital’s investigation was not 
reasonably diligent, and therefore that the hospital has acquired an 
obligation for purposes of the FCA. In fact, CMS conceded that the question 
whether a particular investigation was conducted with “reasonable 
diligence” would be open to interpretation on the unique facts of each case. 
In its comments to the A and B rule, CMS noted that Commenters on the 
proposed rule had asked for “more detail on how to judge what is 
‘reasonable’ about a reasonable inquiry, such as taking into account the 
unique characteristics of the provider or supplier and the nature of the 
problem.”184 CMS responded by pointing to its definition of “reasonable 
diligence” in the final rule, and went on to explain that “the concept of 
‘reasonableness’ is fact-dependent.”185 Of course, what seems “reasonable” 
to a provider during its investigation might be viewed differently by a court 
or jury after the fact. 
To be sure, the A and B Rule is more favorable to providers than either 
the Healthfirst approach, which holds that overpayments are “identified” 
 
 
 184. Reporting and Returning of Overpayments, 81 Fed. Reg. at 7662.  
 185. Id. 
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once a provider is put on notice that they potentially exist,186 or the C and D 
Rule, which makes overpayments “identified” when the provider “has 
determined, or should have determined through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence” that they exist, even if they could not yet have been quantified.187 
The Healthfirst court candidly admitted that its interpretation of the Sixty-
Day Rule would “impose a demanding standard of compliance in particular 
cases” because  
an overpayment would technically qualify as an “obligation” even 
where a provider receives an email like Kane’s, struggles to conduct 
an internal audit, and reports its efforts to the Government within the 
sixty-day window, but has yet to isolate and return all overpayments 
sixty-one days after being put on notice of potential overpayments.188 
Similarly, under the C and D Rule, an overpayment is “identified” once 
the provider should have determined it exists, even if the provider did not 
have enough time to quantify it. The A and B Rule at least recognizes that 
even a reasonably diligent investigation may fail to quantify all 
overpayments within sixty days. Yet although the A and B Rule is better 
than the alternatives, its lack of an actual knowledge requirement still means 
a provider can acquire an obligation despite its good faith belief that it was 
conducting an adequate investigation. 
Of course, as the Healthfirst court pointed out, “the mere existence of an 
‘obligation’ does not establish a violation of the FCA.”189 A provider with 
an obligation must still knowingly “conceal” or “avoid” it to violate the 
FCA. The Healthfirst court speculated that when a hospital has truly tried 
its hardest to investigate potential overpayments, it would likely not have 
acted with the requisite scienter to turn its obligation into a violation of the 
FCA.190 According to the court, in the situation where the hospital is “still 
scrambling” on the sixty-first day to diligently report and return 
overpayments, “the provider would not have acted with the reckless 
disregard, deliberate ignorance, or actual knowledge of an overpayment 
 
 
 186. See Kane ex rel. United States v. Healthfirst, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 3d 370, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 187. 42 C.F.R. §§ 422.326(c) (Part C); 423.360(c) (Part D). 
 188. Healthfirst, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 389. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id. (“[I]n the reverse false claims context, it is only when an obligation is knowingly 
concealed or knowingly and improperly avoided or decreased that a provider has violated the FCA. 
Therefore, prosecutorial discretion would counsel against the institution of enforcement actions aimed 
at well-intentioned healthcare providers working with reasonable haste to address erroneous 
overpayments. Such actions would be inconsistent with the spirit of the law and would be unlikely to 
succeed.”). 
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required to support an FCA claim.”191  
It seems uncontroversial that when a hospital conducts an all-out 
investigation from the moment it learns of potential overpayments, it has 
not recklessly disregarded its obligation to repay. However, it is possible 
that a hospital conducting a somewhat less vigorous investigation could be 
found to have recklessly disregarded an obligation. The federal courts of 
appeals have interpreted “reckless disregard” in the context of the FCA to 
mean “aggravated gross negligence” or “an extreme version of ordinary 
negligence.”192 While this standard is more protective of hospitals than 
ordinary negligence, it nevertheless leaves hospitals open to claims that they 
were grossly negligent in designing and carrying out their investigations, 
perhaps by starting too late, committing too few man hours, or otherwise 
planning the investigation poorly. Because “no proof of specific intent to 
defraud” is required for an action to be “knowing,”193 it will be up to the 
finder of fact to determine how negligent an investigation is too negligent. 
This means that, under the A and B Rule, hospitals that are very sloppy but 
lack bad intent may nonetheless be exposed to crushing FCA liability.  
B. Problems with Using the FCA to Incentivize Diligent Provider Claims 
Auditing  
The FCA was originally designed to deter bad actors from defrauding 
the federal government. Hence its punitive sanctions.194 But when it comes 
to Medicare and Medicaid overpayments, the FCA is used in a very different 
way today.195 As Healthfirst and the foregoing discussion illustrate, a 
 
 
 191. Id. at 389–90. 
 192. United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 941–42 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See also United States v. 
King-Vassel, 728 F.3d 707, 712–13 (7th Cir. 2013) (agreeing with Krizek); United States ex. rel. Farmer 
v. City of Houston, 523 F.3d 333, 338 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2008) (same); United States ex rel. Aakhus v. 
Dyncorp, Inc., 136 F.3d 676, 682 (10th Cir. 1998) (same); Urquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan Univ., 780 F.3d 
1039, 1058 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Our sister circuits have uniformly described reckless disregard for 
purposes of the False Claims Act as akin to ‘an extension of gross negligence’ or an ‘extreme version of 
ordinary negligence.’” (citing Krizek, 111 F.3d at 942, and Farmer, 523 F.3d at 338 & n.9)); Hagood v. 
Sonoma Cnty. Water Agency, 81 F.3d 1465, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that “knowing” for FCA 
purposes requires more than “innocent mistake or mere negligence”). Cf. United States ex rel. Miller v. 
Weston Educ., Inc., 840 F.3d 494, 500 (8th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “knowingly false” statements do 
not include “‘[i]nnocent mistakes and negligence,’” and therefore in order to be “knowingly false” a 
claim “‘must be a lie’” (quoting United States ex rel. Onnen v. Sioux Falls Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 49-5, 
688 F.3d 410, 413 n.2 (8th Cir. 2012))). 
 193. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(B) (2012). 
 194. See supra notes 64–71. 
 195. Cf. Krause, supra note 4, at 125 (observing that novel applications of the FCA to the health 
care industry “signal the government’s willingness to invoke the FCA against activities that are 
increasingly far removed from traditional types of government procurement fraud”). 
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hospital might in theory be found liable for the FCA’s treble damages and 
sizable penalties despite never having acted with intent worse than gross 
negligence at any point in the claims or repayment processes. The FERA 
Amendments and the Sixty-Day Rule have thus expanded the FCA beyond 
its original use. No longer is the FCA used solely to punish and deter 
intentional fraudsters—in the Medicare and Medicaid context, it is now a 
tool to incentivize hospitals to diligently manage their claims auditing 
processes. The FCA, with its treble damages and large penalties, is the big 
“stick” the government can threaten to use against providers to convince 
them to thoroughly review Medicare and Medicaid payments.196 As 
discussed previously, correctly submitting a Medicare or Medicaid claim 
can be exceedingly tricky.197 Billing errors are often made in good faith 
simply because of the difficulty of compliance.198 Today, however, 
“providers have discovered that billing errors once viewed as mistakes in 
need of correction, are now attacked as crimes that compel million dollar 
settlements.”199 Given that perfect compliance can be so difficult, it is worth 
asking whether the grave threat of prosecution under the FCA is the 
appropriate means of incentivizing thorough provider claims review. In this 
Section, I discuss three major problems with using the FCA in this role, at 
least as applied to hospitals that have not intentionally defrauded the 
government. 
1. Reputational Harms and Provider Mistrust 
One undesirable result of imposing FCA liability on hospitals that have 
not acted with bad intent, even if they have acted incompetently, is that it 
lumps together fraud and mismanagement. This has the potential to 
stigmatize hospitals as fraudsters, when in fact their only misdeed was not 
mounting a sufficiently diligent response after being notified of potential 
overpayments, which may have originally been caused by honest 
 
 
 196. See Krause, supra note 11, at 1367 (referring to the FCA as the “primary weapon in the fight 
against health care fraud”). 
 197. See Reinhardt, supra note 30 (describing the “regulatory complexity” of Medicare as 
“unrivaled anywhere in the world”); supra notes 26–33 and accompanying text. 
 198. See Jost & Davies, supra note 4, at 294 (“[T]here are many uncertainties about the billing 
requirements imposed on providers, and doubtless, there are instances when well-meaning individuals 
with billing responsibilities are simply unable to parse these complexities.”) (footnote omitted); Public 
Comment to CMS Proposed Rule, Fed’n of Am. Hosps., supra note 118, at 2 (“[I]n a program the size, 
magnitude, and complexity of Medicare, the reality is that there are ambiguities and uncertainties about 
applicable rules and guidance . . . . There also is the risk for human error given the intricate rules and 
large volume of Medicare billings hospitals submit.”). 
 199. Meador & Warren, supra note 8, at 456. 
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mistakes.200 Incompetence and malfeasance are, of course, very different. 
But the FCA does not distinguish between the two, meaning that a good 
faith violator of the Act will be the same as an intentional fraudster in the 
public’s eyes. Mistaking the one for the other runs the risk of breeding 
resentment in the provider community because they are labeled as bad 
actors even for their good faith errors.201  
The case for distinguishing unintentional noncompliance from 
intentional fraud is especially strong in view of the tremendous complexity 
of Medicare and Medicaid.202 Since complying with these laws is not merely 
a matter of good intentions, even reasonably diligent hospitals may make 
errors in the claims submission process.203 If a provider makes such an 
honest mistake, and then is guilty of nothing more than a grossly negligent 
investigation into the overpayment, it seems distinctly unfair to say it has 
“defrauded” the government. But because courts applying the FCA are 
constrained by statutory minimums with regard to both damages and 
penalties,204 a provider will still face punitive sanctions for violating the 
FCA regardless of whether its actions consisted of, at one extreme, 
intentionally submitting claims to Medicaid for services never performed 
 
 
 200. See Public Comment to CMS Proposed Rule, Fed’n of Am. Hosps., supra note 118, at 2 (“[T]he 
Proposed Rule reads like a fraud and abuse enforcement policy, and creates an aura that every Medicare 
overpayment is the byproduct of suspicious behavior of providers and suppliers.”); U.S. CHAMBER INST. 
FOR LEGAL REFORM, FIXING THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: THE CASE FOR COMPLIANCE-FOCUSED REFORMS 
(2013) (“Being adjudicated liable for fraud may carry with it a stigma of quasi-criminal wrongdoing.”), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Fixing_The_FCA_ Pages_Web.pdf. 
 201. See Krause, supra note 11, at 1368 (noting that the FCA’s “enormous penalties” force hospitals 
to settle FCA allegations, even when those allegations are based on hospitals’ “good faith interpretations 
of ambiguous health care regulations,” thus “threaten[ing] to alienate the health care provider 
community”); Snyder, supra note 13, at 11 (“[T]he federal prosecutor in false claims cases is armed with 
what appears to be an arsenal of fraud deterrents. This regulatory gauntlet within which health care 
providers ‘operate’ is a source of frustration and concern for health care providers and their advocates.”). 
 202. See supra notes 26–33 and accompanying text (discussing the complexity of Medicare). 
 203. See Belanger & Bennett, supra note 95, at 31 (“FCA liability based on the retention of 
overpayments by the government is a real issue for healthcare providers because they routinely file 
dozens if not hundreds of claims, tend to be paid in lump sum amounts with payments of many claims 
at once, and then have to credit each component of a large payment to individual patient accounts. The 
opportunities for unintended errors, given this volume of billing and accounting transactions, are 
legion.”). As proof, consider the fact that the Recovery Audit Program uncovered 1.5 million improper 
claims in fiscal year 2013 alone. RECOVERY AUDITING IN MEDICARE FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013, supra 
note 32, at 11 tbl. 1. Even assuming that some of these were submitted with the intent to defraud, a 
significant number were likely submitted in error simply because of the difficulty of complying with the 
law.  
 204. Courts do have some discretion to adjust the amount of penalties imposed, but cannot go below 
the statutory minimum of $10,781 per false claim. See supra note 66. Courts also have discretion to 
reduce the FCA’s treble damages if the defendant cooperates with the investigation, but again there is a 
statutory floor of “2 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of 
that person.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2012).  
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and then falsifying records to cover it up, or, at the other extreme, 
accidentally submitting an improper payment because of a software glitch 
and then implementing a five-person team to report and return the 
overpayments when a court determines that using fewer than fifteen was 
grossly negligent.205 The hospital that sets out with bad intent and the 
hospital that devises an ineffective investigatory plan are both classified as 
fraudsters, whom the public will deride for depleting the public fisc. We 
ought to be concerned about the significant reputational harms done to 
hospitals that are labeled as violators of the FCA for making honest mistakes 
in managing complicated claims systems.206 
2. The FCA’s Punitive Liability is Inappropriate When Applied to 
Grossly Negligent Providers 
As previously discussed, the basic problem the FCA addresses is that the 
government cannot prevent itself from being defrauded unless it knows it is 
being defrauded.207 The FCA responds to this problem in two ways. First, it 
incentivizes those with information about fraud against the government to 
speak up.208 Second, it aims to make penalties for fraudulent conduct large 
enough to outweigh the benefits fraudsters receive, thereby deterring 
fraud.209 The Act thus serves two distinct (although related) functions: 
incentivizing those with information about already-committed fraud to 
come forward, and deterring those who would commit fraud in the future 
from doing so. The Act addresses the first problem through its qui tam 
 
 
 205. Thus, providers may perceive a mismatch between the FCA’s immense financial penalties 
and the reprehensibility of their own conduct in submitting a mistaken Medicare or Medicaid claim. In 
the words of the Louisiana Hospital Association, using the False Claims Act to punish hospitals for 
billing errors “borders on extortion.” Letter from Robert P. Murphy, Gen. Counsel, Gen. Accounting 
Office, to Hon. William M. Thomas, Chairman, Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and 
Means & Hon. Jim McCrery, Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means 15 n.30 (July 
22, 1998), http://www.gao.gov/assets/200/199164.pdf.  
 206. Professor Krause suggests that one reason to be concerned about perceived unfairness in the 
application of the FCA to the health care industry is that it may cause providers “to question the 
legitimacy of the government’s enforcement efforts,” which in turn may lead to “greater noncompliance, 
necessitating the use of even more coercive enforcement mechanisms.” Krause, supra note 4, at 210, 
212. 
 207. See SYLVIA, supra note 54, § 1:4. For this Note’s earlier discussion of the FCA’s solution to 
this informational problem, see supra notes 55–71 and accompanying text. 
 208. See SYLVIA, supra note 54, § 1:14 (“From its inception, the Act’s central premise has been that 
in order to address the lack of information about fraud, the Government must seek the public’s 
assistance.”); supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text. 
 209. See SYLVIA, supra note 54, § 1:14 (stating that the FCA’s “increased damages and penalties” 
were “intended to make the cost of engaging in fraud much higher”); supra notes 64–71 and 
accompanying text.  
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provisions, and the second through its treble damages and penalties. 
From a theoretical perspective, the problem with any definition of 
“identified” that does not require actual knowledge of overpayments is that 
it carries the potential for the FCA’s severe, deterrence-minded penalties to 
be applied even in situations where deterrence may not be possible. In the 
quintessential case of fraud that the FCA’s sanctions were designed to deter, 
the fraudster is consciously considering whether or not to engage in fraud. 
The FCA aims to influence this decision by convincing the potential 
fraudster that the costs of his actions will outweigh the benefits, thereby 
preventing the inchoate fraud from being completed.210 In such a case, the 
FCA’s heavy, extracompensatory damages clearly serve their intended 
function.211 
In contrast, a hospital that has received Medicare or Medicaid 
overpayments may violate the FCA without ever intending to defraud the 
government. Of course, if the hospital is considering intentionally delaying 
repayment, or attempting to hide the fact of the overpayment to avoid its 
obligation to repay altogether, then the threat of FCA liability will likely 
alter its calculus. But, as demonstrated, the various interpretations of the 
Sixty-Day Rule may sweep in even those hospitals that violate the Act 
negligently rather than intentionally. For these hospitals, the potential for 
FCA liability may not alter their behavior for the simple reason that they are 
already doing what they believe is necessary to comply.212 Indeed, the A 
and B Rule’s nebulous “timely manner” standard provides so little guidance 
to providers about how quickly a given investigation must be completed that 
a provider can never be sure it is doing enough (unless, perhaps, it is literally 
expending all its compliance resources on one investigation). While at the 
margins the threat of FCA liability may encourage hospitals to commit more 
resources to overpayment investigations (which might result in better 
compliance), even the threat of onerous liability will not influence the 
behavior of a hospital that truly believes it is already conducting a 
“reasonably diligent” investigation.213 For these providers, the FCA’s 
 
 
 210. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 211. See Jost & Davies, supra note 4, at 295.  
 212. See id. at 294 (noting that the use of fraud and abuse laws to police violations of complex health 
care regulations is less fair when “fraud and abuse laws permit[] civil or criminal liability based on 
unintentional conduct” (emphasis added)). 
 213. Jost & Davies argue that it is appropriate to subject reckless providers to civil fraud penalties 
because “the reckless provider must have been aware of the fact that he or she was taking some risk . . . 
and have been willing to disregard that risk.” Id. at 295. They go on to argue that “[i]t is fair to burden 
a provider with the obligation to choose correctly, once it can be proved that the provider realized that 
he or she was at hazard of obtaining a benefit to which he or she was not entitled.” Id. at 295–96. Under 
their view, once a provider realizes that it may be obtaining a benefit (like overpayments), we can fairly 
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punitive liability does not serve its intended deterrence function, but instead 
stigmatizes good faith provider conduct as “fraudulent” and provides the 
government (and any qui tam relator) with a large windfall.214  
Moreover, to the extent that the threat of punitive sanctions may induce 
providers to be overly cautious and commit more resources to all 
investigations, this is not necessarily a desirable outcome. Because 
providers do not have unlimited resources with which to ensure they comply 
with health care laws, providers should be allowed to decide for themselves 
how to allocate scarce compliance resources.215 If a provider is put on notice 
of potential overpayments that are very likely to have actually occurred, an 
all-hands-on-deck investigation may be warranted. But if the potential 
overpayments probably did not happen, a less vigorous response may be 
appropriate. By imposing the vague standard of a “timely” investigation, 
and aiming FCA sanctions at investigations that fail to live up to this 
standard in a grossly negligent way, the A and B Rule threatens providers 
into expending maximum enforcement resources every time they are put on 
notice of a potential overpayment.216  
The problem with this approach is that, in practice, providers cannot 
allocate maximum resources to each investigation. Some compliance 
activities must be prioritized over others. Suppose a provider makes a good 
faith decision to devote more resources to Investigation X than Investigation 
Y, even though Investigation Y is objectively more likely to involve actual 
overpayments. As a result, Investigation Y is not completed in a “timely 
 
 
sanction it for bad choices that it makes about how to investigate that possibility. But even if a provider 
knows it may have obtained an overpayment, it does not make sense to use punitive liability to punish 
the provider’s subsequent good faith decisions that (a) are made under resource constraints, see infra 
notes 215–20 and accompanying text; and (b) the provider may not have even realized at the time would 
lead to an “untimely” investigation, and therefore are incapable of deterrence.  
 214. Nor will imposing punitive damages on a hospital that has tried in good faith to comply with 
the law serve the other purpose for imposing punitive damages, namely, retribution. See Pac. Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) (stating that “punitive damages are imposed for the purposes 
of retribution and deterrence”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) 
(“Punitive Damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil 
motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.”). When a provider has tried in good faith to 
meet its report and return obligations, it is difficult to say it acted with an “evil motive” or “reckless 
indifference to the rights of others.” 
 215. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985) (holding that courts should defer to 
executive agencies on how agencies choose to use their limited enforcement resources).  
 216. The Healthfirst standard, in contrast, would not ask whether the investigation was “timely,” 
but instead only whether the investigation was completed within sixty days from when the hospital was 
put on notice of the overpayments. If not, the hospital would acquire an obligation. See supra note 186 
and accompanying text. Thus, the Healthfirst standard also pressures hospitals to allocate resources in a 
particular way—namely, so as to ensure that all investigations can be completed within sixty days, 
regardless of how complicated they might be.  
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manner.” Even if it was grossly negligent for the provider to think 
Investigation X deserved resources over Investigation Y, is this really the 
kind of decision for which we ought to impose punitive liability? This 
scenario is far afield from the classic fraud situation the FCA’s punitive 
sanctions were originally intended to apply to, in which a calculating 
fraudster is considering whether to take advantage of an information 
asymmetry to defraud the government.217 Here, by contrast, the provider 
may not have better information than the government about which claims 
were actually overpaid (at least, until it completes its investigation), and 
must make a judgment call about how to allocate its scarce resources. If the 
FCA is to be used in such a radically different way today, this policy 
judgment should at least be made by the popularly elected Congress, rather 
than through interpretations of a statutory term made by unelected judges 
and agency officials.218 
A final problem with limiting provider discretion over how to allocate 
compliance resources is that overly thorough investigations drive up 
provider compliance costs even in cases where a less rigorous investigation 
might suffice.219 If providers cannot pass these costs along to insurers, they 
will either have to absorb the costs themselves or increase the cost of the 
underlying health care. By threatening devastating liability based on 
uncertain standards, the Sixty-Day Rule and the FCA infringe on providers’ 
discretion to allocate scarce compliance resources as they see fit, instead 
compelling them to err on the side of more expensive investigations every 
time.220 
 
 
 217. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
 218. See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686–87 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that Congress should not be allowed to “delegate 
important choices of social policy to politically unresponsive administrators”).  
 219. In opposing the proposed A and B Rule, the Federation of American Hospitals argued that 
CMS’s proposed definition of “identified” would “impose an unreasonable administrative burden on 
hospitals” because it might place providers under “a broad duty to conduct full-scale audits that go well 
beyond the statutory requirement to report and return overpayments.” Public Comment to CMS 
Proposed Rule, Fed’n of Am. Hosps., supra note 118, at 7. The Federation continued: “This proposal 
will impose new infrastructure and expense obligations on hospitals that will increase the cost of health 
care services furnished to Medicare beneficiaries. . . . [It would also] essentially create a broad spectrum 
audit process without regard to whether an overpayment exists or not.” Id.  
 220. See Public Comment to CMS Proposed Rule, Emory Healthcare, supra note 115, at 3 (“The 
proposed [A and B Rule] would interfere with processes we already have in place to address both routine 
and non-routine overpayments, and cause undue burden and the diversion and expenditure of 
unnecessary and scarce resources.”); Public Comment to CMS Proposed Rule, Am. Med. Ass’n, supra 
note 115, at 1 (arguing that, by attempting to incentivize providers “‘to exercise reasonable diligence to 
determine whether an overpayment exists,’” the proposed A and B Rule creates a “perpetual duty to 
‘research’ whether any overpayment may exist” and a “boundless duty to troll medical records in search 
of innumerable vulnerabilities” (quoting Reporting and Returning of Overpayments, 77 Fed. Reg. 9179, 
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One might argue that the class of hospitals who conduct what they 
honestly believe to be “reasonably diligent” investigations, yet are grossly 
negligent and incur FCA liability anyway, is likely to be small enough that 
we should accept it as collateral damage of a rule that otherwise deters 
intentional fraud. And it is certainly true that it will sometimes be difficult 
to distinguish between, on the one hand, honest but incompetent 
investigations and, on the other, intentional efforts to delay or avoid 
repayment. However, that does not mean we should use a legal tool that 
treats the distinction as meaningless. The Sixty-Day Rule, as interpreted by 
the A and B Rule, C and D Rule, and Healthfirst, applies the same punitive 
sanctions not only to intentional failures to repay the government, but to 
grossly negligent efforts as well.221 As a consequence, grossly negligent 
hospitals may face punitive liability designed to deter intentional fraud.222 
A better alternative would at least attempt to distinguish between negligent 
and intentional failures to repay, and reserve the most severe punitive 
penalties for the latter.  
 
 
9182 (proposed Feb. 16, 2012))). Cf. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) 
(holding that courts cannot impose procedural rulemaking requirements above those mandated by the 
Administrative Procedure Act, in part because such “Monday morning quarterbacking” by courts would 
force agencies to always err on the side of using more procedures). 
 221. As previously noted, courts do have the power under the FCA to impose only double damages, 
rather than treble, and penalties as low as $10,781 per false claim on good faith violators. See supra note 
204. But these sanctions are still too severe for a provider that has acted in good faith all along. 
 222. Of course, some negligent conduct may be bad enough to merit deterrence. In recognition of 
this fact, some states allow punitive damages to be imposed for grossly negligent conduct. See 
Christopher P. Flanagan & Christopher J. Seusing, Punitive damages based on gross negligence: 
Massachusetts bucks the trend, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 3, 2013) (noting that eight states allow punitive 
damages based on gross negligence and collecting cases), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail. 
aspx?g=ffda1144-270d-494b-9ea0-6aebecefa1d2. However, these states generally require the grossly 
negligent conduct to display certain aggravating characteristics before punitive damages can be imposed. 
See, e.g., Valladares v. Bank of Am. Corp., 197 So. 3d 1, 11 (Fla. 2016) (“The character of negligence 
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages must be of a gross and flagrant character, evincing 
reckless disregard of human life, or of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous effects, or there is 
that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences, 
or which shows wantonness or recklessness, or a grossly careless disregard of the safety and welfare of 
the public, or that reckless indifference to the rights of others which is equivalent to an intentional 
violation of them.”); Peoples Bank of N. Ky., Inc. v. Crowe Chizek & Co. LLC, 277 S.W.3d 255, 268 
(Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (“In a case where gross negligence is used as the basis for punitive damages, gross 
negligence has the same character of outrage justifying punitive damages as willful and malicious 
conduct in torts where the injury is intentionally inflicted.”); Rogers v. T.J.X. Cos., 404 S.E.2d 664, 666 
(N.C. 1991) (stating that, to be eligible for punitive damages, “[t]he tort in question must be accompanied 
by additional aggravating or outrageous conduct,” which must include “evidence of insult, indignity, 
malice, oppression, or bad motive”). Thus, the type of negligent conduct that the states have deemed 
sufficiently blameworthy to warrant punitive damages seems to differ qualitatively from the conduct at 
issue here (i.e., establishing inadequate procedures to return accidentally overpaid Medicare and 
Medicaid claims).  
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The bottom line is that the FCA was imported into the Medicare and 
Medicaid overpayment context because it was the heaviest-duty law 
available to convince hospitals to return overpayments quickly.223 The 
potential for FCA liability probably frightens hospitals enough to 
investigate promptly in most cases. But so would a threat to blow to 
smithereens all hospitals whose investigations into overpayments are 
sufficiently substandard. By imposing onerous FCA sanctions even on 
hospitals that act without intent to defraud, the law levies the harshest 
punitive punishment even when it may not deter similar conduct in future,224 
and interferes with providers’ discretion to allocate scarce compliance 
resources.  
3. Prosecutorial Discretion and Settlement Leverage 
Another important aspect of the FCA’s application to the health care 
industry is that prosecutors now use it to reach large settlements.225 In this 
light, reconsider the Healthfirst court’s acknowledgement that its definition 
of “identified” could place health care providers under a “demanding 
standard of compliance in particular cases.”226 The court explained that it 
was comfortable with the risk that even some good faith providers might 
acquire FCA obligations because the fact that a hospital has an obligation 
does not mean it has already violated the FCA.227 Rather, a hospital would 
still have to “knowingly conceal” or “knowingly and improperly avoid” the 
obligation to incur any liability under the FCA.228 Thus, the court explained 
that “prosecutorial discretion” would discourage the government from 
 
 
 223. See S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10, reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 437 (touting the FCA as 
“[o]ne of the most successful tools for combating waste and abuse in Government spending”). 
 224. Punitive damages can also serve another function: to provide adequate incentives to sue when 
the amount of compensatory damages a plaintiff would recover is too small to induce enough plaintiffs 
to bring actions. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 494 (2008) (noting that “heavier 
punitive awards have been thought to be justifiable . . . when the value of injury and the corresponding 
compensatory award are small (providing low incentives to sue)”). While it is certainly true that, at a 
certain point, low damages would provide inadequate incentives for qui tam plaintiffs to blow the whistle 
on hospitals that intentionally defraud the government, relators would still have ample incentive to sue 
even if their potential recoveries were considerably smaller than 15–30% of the vast liability hospitals 
can face under the FCA.  
 225. See Krause, supra note 4, at 126 (noting that “the majority of FCA cases are resolved through 
settlement rather than trial”); Meador & Warren, supra note 8, at 456 (“Health care providers have 
discovered that billing errors once viewed as mistakes in need of correction, are now attacked as crimes 
that compel million dollar settlements.”); supra note 8 (cataloging some recent FCA settlements). 
 226. Kane ex rel. United States v. Healthfirst, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 3d 370, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 227. See id. (“[T]he mere existence of an ‘obligation’ does not establish a violation of the FCA.”). 
 228. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012). 
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pursuing cases in which the provider was “well-intentioned.”229 According 
to the court, “[s]uch actions would be inconsistent with the spirit of the law 
and would be unlikely to succeed.”230  
For starters, an appeal to prosecutorial discretion is problematic in the 
context of the FCA because actions may be brought not only by prosecutors, 
but also by qui tam relators. Among new health care fraud actions filed 
under the FCA in 2015, 423 were qui tam suits, compared to just 25 non-
qui tam suits.231 Because relators may be “tempted more by the prospect of 
financial reward than by righteous indignation,”232 a sense of “prosecutorial 
discretion” is less likely to restrain them from filing actions in cases where 
a government prosecutor might decline to do so. It is true that recoveries 
tend to be lower in cases where the relator goes it alone than in cases in 
which the United States intervenes.233 Yet even if the chances of ultimate 
FCA liability are less when a relator prosecutes an FCA action on her own, 
the fact remains that Healthfirst and CMS’s regulations, which do not 
condition obligations on actual knowledge of overpayments, make it easier 
for profit-driven relators to plead obligations. 
This observation leads to a more fundamental point: an obligation alone 
may be intimidating enough to provide both prosecutors and relators with 
substantial leverage to force a settlement. Even if a prosecutor or relator is 
not confident that she can prove a hospital acted with the scienter necessary 
for liability, the fact that she can establish an obligation means the case can 
at least get past step one. Getting past step one increases the odds that a 
defendant will eventually be found liable for violating the FCA.234 This 
 
 
 229. Healthfirst, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 389. 
 230. Id. 
 231. DOJ, Fraud Statistics—Health and Human Services, supra note 7. Taking all areas of 
enforcement into account, the qui tam to non-qui tam ratio for new matters filed in 2015 was 632 to 105. 
DOJ, Fraud Statistics—Overview, supra note 96. 
 232. Joan H. Krause, Twenty-Five Years of Health Law Through the Lens of the Civil False Claims 
Act, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 13, 16 (2010). 
 233. For health care cases in 2015, the government recovered $1.36 billion in settlements and 
judgments in cases where it intervened, compared with $468 million in cases where it declined to 
intervene. DOJ, Fraud Statistics—Health and Human Services, supra note 7. Across all FCA cases in 
2015, the figures were $1.76 billion in cases where the government intervened and $1.15 billion when 
it declined. DOJ, Fraud Statistics—Overview, supra note 96. It is unclear whether this result is 
attributable to the fact that the government is more likely to intervene in strong cases, or to the potency 
of the government’s advocacy when it intervenes. Compare Engstrom, supra note 18, at 1712 (“DOJ 
statistics have long suggested that intervened cases overwhelmingly generate recoveries while declined 
cases overwhelmingly end in dismissal. One common interpretation of this discrepancy is that DOJ 
selects cases on pure merits grounds such that the residuum of unintervened cases can be presumed 
meritless.”), with id. at 1713 (noting that some argue that “the intervened-declined outcome discrepancy 
stems from the litigation leverage DOJ involvement brings”). 
 234. Although, how much an obligation increases the odds of FCA liability will vary case to case. 
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increase in the likelihood of liability may be enough to force a rational 
hospital to settle.235 Given the potentially massive amount of liability at 
stake in an FCA case,236 including exclusion from future participation in 
Medicare,237 defendants are especially unlikely to want to risk full FCA 
liability.238 Because any bump in their odds of losing the case brings the end 
result of FCA liability that much closer, simply being able to establish an 
obligation may be enough to convince a hospital it is not worth it to carry 
the fight any further and risk the FCA’s crippling sanctions.239 The 
Healthfirst court ignored this reality when it posited that the FCA’s scienter 
requirements would protect “well-intentioned” providers who acquire 
obligations. Indeed, in Healthfirst itself the parties settled for nearly $3 
million one year after the court ruled the government had successfully 
pleaded an obligation.240  
Furthermore, the Healthfirst court’s suggestion that we can rely on 
 
 
In some cases, it may be obvious the provider lacked the scienter necessary for liability; in others, it may 
be a close call. 
 235. When faced with the prospect of an FCA suit, rational health care providers will consider the 
total amount for which they may be liable as the result of litigation, and multiply that amount by the 
probability that they will be found liable. The resulting sum, plus litigation costs, is the amount that the 
rational provider should be willing to settle the case for because, in theory, the price of settling and 
litigating is then the same. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and 
Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 418 (1973) (stating that the maximum a defendant will 
agree to settle for “is the expected cost of the litigation to him and consists of his litigation expenses, 
plus the cost of an adverse judgment multiplied by the probability as he estimates it of the plaintiff’s 
winning . . . minus his settlement costs”). Thus, the amount a provider should be willing to pay to settle 
a case is partially a function of the potential damages and penalties at stake (which are large in an FCA 
case). As the probability that a provider will be found liable increases—for example, because the 
government can plead an obligation—the amount for which the provider should be willing to settle 
increases accordingly. And as the possibility of FCA liability draws nearer, risk averse providers will be 
more likely to opt for settlement to avoid the full blow of the FCA’s high damages and penalties. 
 236. See supra notes 13, 46–49 and accompanying text.  
 237. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. The “death sentence” of exclusion can only be 
sought by the government once it intervenes, not by relators proceeding on their own. Consequently, 
government intervention in a qui tam action creates a powerful incentive for a provider to settle. 
Engstrom, supra note 18, at 1713.  
 238. See Krause, supra note 11, at 1368 (“[C]ritics now argue that the Act’s enormous penalties 
give health care providers virtually no choice but to settle cases that could not be proven in court.”); 
Krause, supra note 4, at 127 (same); Sage, supra note 4, at 1180 (“[L]arge organizations have such a 
large stake in avoiding exclusion from Medicare that they readily settle pending charges, making much 
of fraud control resemble a rebate program more than a law enforcement exercise.”); Belanger & 
Bennett, supra note 95, at 38 (“It is the rare provider that can choose to eschew federal dollars and, 
therefore, the specter of a FCA case looms large.”). As previously noted, hospitals may take the threat 
of exclusion from Medicare especially seriously because they rely on Medicare for a significant portion 
of their overall revenue. See supra note 17. 
 239. Cf. Belanger & Bennett, supra note 95, at 39 (“From a practical perspective, FERA and [the 
ACA] have tilted the balance of negotiating power decidedly in favor of the government.”). 
 240. Press Release, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces $2.95 Million Settlement With Hospital 
Group For Improperly Delaying Repayment Of Medicaid Funds, supra note 180. 
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prosecutors to restrain themselves from prosecuting meritless cases may be 
too optimistic. Fighting fraud is politically popular.241 If a federal prosecutor 
can report that her office has recovered taxpayer dollars by forcing a 
hospital to settle a claim that it fraudulently retained public money, she may 
reap a political advantage.242 The public will likely not distinguish between, 
on the one hand, a hospital that was actively seeking to defraud the public 
by getting more than its fair share of government payments and, on the 
other, a hospital that accidentally received an overpayment, conducted a 
grossly negligent investigation, and was then strong-armed into settling to 
avoid the possibility of crushing liability.243 The Department of Justice will 
issue a triumphant press release either way. Given this reality, we should 
not be surprised if prosecutors fail to exercise perfect restraint when tempted 
by the political incentive to pursue and settle borderline cases.  
Another consideration is the recent proliferation of state versions of the 
federal FCA.244 Because these state laws are directly inspired by the federal 
statute,245 judicial interpretations of the federal act will likely influence 
interpretations of its state law counterparts. The danger for prosecutorial 
overreaching is even greater at the state level, where state prosecutors must 
actively seek reelection and are therefore likely to be even more finely 
attuned to the political consequences of their actions.246 The political 
advantages of FCA settlements might be too much for state prosecutors to 
pass up. Especially when it comes to state FCAs, the Healthfirst court’s 
 
 
 241. See supra note 4. 
 242. See Krause, supra note 11, at 1412 (“[F]ederal prosecutors—particularly the United States 
Attorneys—have strong personal incentives to apply the law in ways that benefit their personal agendas 
rather than the public good.”); Golinkin II, supra note 4, at 317 (noting that federal prosecutors “have 
tremendous power that they are undoubtedly tempted to use in furtherance of their own personal 
agendas”). But see Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative 
Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 249 (1980) (“[U]nlike most of his state and 
local counterparts, the federal prosecutor is not an elected official, and is not subject to popular political 
pressures, although he may be removed by the President.”). 
 243. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 244. See SYLVIA, supra note 54, § 2:21 (“The success of the False Claims Act in obtaining 
recoveries for the United States has led a number of states and local governments to adopt their own 
versions of the Act.”). See also id. § 12 (providing an overview of state false claims laws). For more on 
state false claims acts, see supra note 20. 
 245. See James F. Barger, Jr. et al., States, Statutes, and Fraud: An Empirical Study of Emerging 
State False Claims Acts, 80 TUL. L. REV. 465, 469 (2005) (noting that state false claims statutes are 
“modeled after” the federal FCA). 
 246. See Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys 
General, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 8–9 (“[S]tate attorneys general are politicians, that is, they are 
elected rather than appointed officials. . . . [T]he natural ambition of a politician who holds high state 
office is to be elected governor; hence, there is often . . . an incentive on the part of the attorney general 
to bring suits that confer a political benefit on him . . . . [And this leads attorneys general to bring] high-
profile lawsuits that attract publicity to the attorney general . . . .”). 
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assurance that providers can rely on prosecutorial discretion rings hollow.247 
IV. THE SOLUTION: AN ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE STANDARD FOR 
“IDENTIFIED” 
A better alternative to the existing interpretations of “identified” is a 
bright-line rule: overpayments should not be “identified” unless a provider 
has actual knowledge of both their existence and amount.248 Under this 
standard, mere notice of potential overpayments would never qualify as an 
obligation. Rather, to acquire an obligation, a provider would need to have 
already done the work necessary to determine which claims were actually 
overpaid, and by how much. There would be no question of whether the 
hospital’s investigatory efforts were “reasonably diligent” because the 
standard would look to results, not process. A provider could still violate 
the FCA by recklessly disregarding an obligation, but not until after the 
provider had acquired the obligation via actual knowledge of overpayments.  
The major argument against requiring actual knowledge is the “ostrich 
argument” that such a standard incentivizes providers to remain deliberately 
ignorant of any overpayments they may have received.249 This argument 
presupposes that nothing other than the FCA can adequately incentivize 
hospitals to diligently monitor for overpayments, a proposition with which 
some providers disagree.250 The ostrich argument thus contemplates a stark 
choice: impose liability under the FCA, or impose no liability at all.  
The response to the ostrich argument is to reject the false choice it offers. 
Although some sanctions are certainly necessary to deter providers from 
maintaining deliberate ignorance of overpayments, those sanctions need not 
be the exceptionally heavy sanctions provided for under the FCA. The 
FCA’s serious punitive sanctions make sense for providers who have failed 
to act in the face of actual knowledge of both the existence and amount of 
 
 
 247. Concededly, when a federal court rules on a matter of federal law, any collateral influence its 
holding may have on state courts interpreting similar state laws is of only minor, if any, importance. The 
fact that state attorneys general may possess a strong political incentive to pursue and settle Medicaid 
overpayment cases under state false claims acts is an issue best addressed to the state legislatures that 
draft such statutes and the state courts that construe them. 
 248. The Healthfirst defendants made a similar argument. See Kane ex rel. United States v. 
Healthfirst, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 3d 370, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 249. See supra notes 173–76. 
 250. See Public Comment to CMS Proposed Rule, Univ. of Va. Med. Ctr., at 2 (“CMS believes it 
is necessary to [define ‘identified’ to include acting in deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the 
fact a hospital may have received overpayments] to create an incentive for . . . hospitals to report and 
repay overpayments. Such a view ignores the fact that hospitals are already subject to many government 
audits and reviews and already have many incentives to operate honestly.”), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CMS-2012-0020-0060.  
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overpayments. For these providers, severe punitive sanctions are justifiable 
because they have at least acted with certain knowledge that they owed the 
government money, and, indeed, how much money they owed. Any choice 
to delay or avoid repayment in the face of such actual knowledge is the kind 
of conscious choice punitive liability is appropriate to deter.251 But just 
because the FCA’s “significant” and “‘essentially punitive’”252 sanctions 
are appropriate to deter some bad provider conduct, that does not mean they 
should be haphazardly applied to deter all undesirable provider conduct. For 
the reasons identified in this Note, the deterrence rationale does not justify 
applying the FCA’s punitive liability to providers who have made an honest, 
but grossly negligent, attempt at timely repayment.253 And since it can be 
difficult to distinguish the hospital that has deliberately avoided actual 
knowledge of overpayments from the hospital that has negligently done so, 
it would be better to apply the FCA’s heavy punitive sanctions to neither, 
but instead to reserve the harshest sanctions for providers who have acted 
consciously in the face of actual knowledge of overpayments.  
 If CMS were to redefine “identified” to apply only to overpayments of 
which a provider has actual knowledge, Congress should then fill the gap 
with a more appropriate penalty for providers whose investigatory efforts 
are not “reasonably diligent,” but who do not know for certain that they have 
received overpayments of a particular amount. Appropriate sanctions would 
not be as severe as under the FCA, because they would recognize that 
carelessness cannot be deterred to the same extent as conscious wrongdoing. 
Rather, appropriate sanctions for a provider whose efforts at repayment are 
substandard but who does not have actual knowledge of overpayments 
should be limited to: (a) the amount of the overpayments; plus (b) interest 
for the delay in repayment; plus (c) a percentage of the sum of the 
 
 
 251. See Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (noting that punitive 
damages “are awarded to punish and deter outrageous conduct, and the question is whether a defendant’s 
conduct ‘contains elements of intentional wrongdoing or conscious disregard’ for plaintiff’s rights” 
(quoting Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 549–50 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev’d on other 
grounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976))).  
 252. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1995, 1996 
(2016) (quoting Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 784 (2000)).  
 253. See supra Part III.B.2. Punitive damages are, of course, properly used to deter wrongdoing that 
is difficult to detect. See supra notes 68, 70; BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) 
(noting that higher punitive damages are justified “in cases in which the injury is hard to detect”). Since 
it is difficult for the government to detect Medicare and Medicaid overpayments, see supra note 55, this 
might seem to indicate that punitive damages are appropriately levied against providers who attempt to 
avoid their repayment obligations. However, as discussed previously, punitive damages will only change 
the calculus of providers who are consciously considering whether to engage in fraud. For those 
providers who make an honest, but grossly negligent, effort at timely repayment, punitive damages serve 
no justifiable purpose. See supra notes 210–14 and accompanying text. 
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overpayments and interest to reward the relator for her efforts in bringing 
suit.254 Exclusion from Medicare and/or Medicaid should not be an option. 
This way, the government would be fully compensated for the amount it 
overpaid the provider. The relator would still have adequate financial 
incentives to sue. And, crucially, the provider would still have an incentive 
to conduct its investigation in a non-negligent manner in order to save the 
relator’s share. But rather than a percentage of treble damages plus per-
claim penalties, the relator’s share would be limited to a percentage of the 
government’s compensatory damages plus interest.  
This solution responds to the problems identified in this Note. First, 
hospitals that did not actually know they were in possession of 
overpayments would face less stigma because they would be subject to 
lesser sanctions than intentional fraudsters. Second, the FCA’s large 
punitive damages and penalties would still serve their appropriate function 
of deterring the most blameworthy provider conduct (i.e., failure to act in 
the face of actual knowledge of overpayments), but would not apply to 
grossly negligent providers whose conduct is less capable of being deterred. 
Instead, providers without actual knowledge of overpayments could only be 
subject to lesser liability of between 115 and 130% of the amount of the 
overpayments (plus interest). Third, because an actual knowledge standard 
would preclude merely negligent providers from acquiring obligations, it 
would protect them from being strong-armed into large settlements in 
borderline cases by profit-seeking relators or politically motivated 
prosecutors. Finally, this bright-line rule would also have the benefit of 
certainty. A hospital could be assured that, unless it actually knows of the 
existence and amount of a given overpayment, it has not “identified” that 
overpayment and therefore cannot be liable for the FCA’s serious penalties 
if it does not report and return within sixty days. This would restore 
providers’ discretion to allocate scarce compliance resources. It would also 
ensure that providers no longer need to worry that investigations they 
honestly believe to be “reasonably diligent” are in fact not diligent enough 
to avoid the FCA.  
CONCLUSION 
For the federal government, cases based on health care providers’ failure 
to report and return Medicare and Medicaid overpayments are a potentially 
 
 
 254. The current relator reward formula would do nicely: 15–25% of the government’s recovery if 
the government intervenes, and 25–30% if the government does not. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(2) 
(2012). 
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bountiful new frontier. As recently as August 2015, the United States 
Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Georgia announced that it had 
reached “the first settlement under the False Claims Act involving a health 
care provider’s failure to investigate credit balances on its books to 
determine whether they resulted from overpayments made by a federal 
healthcare program.”255 It was for $6.88 million. Because of the strength of 
the weapon Congress has provided the federal government to police the 
health care industry, it is crucial that it be properly calibrated. For the 
reasons identified in this Note, neither the A and B Rule, C and D Rule, nor 
Healthfirst have yet done so. Accordingly, CMS should reinterpret 
“identified” to require actual knowledge.256 
Nicholas J. Goldin 
 
 
 255. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Pediatric Services of America and Related Entities to Pay $6.88 
Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/usao-
sdga/pr/pediatric-services-america-and-related-entities-pay-688-million-resolve-false-claims.  
 256. CMS is free to change its interpretation in future, so long as it “show[s] that there are good 
reasons for the new policy” and “display[s] awareness that it is changing its position.” FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). 
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